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GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT CROSS-BORDER 
EARNINGS STRIPPING: ESTABLISHING AN 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK* 
J. CLIFTON FLEMING, JR.,** ROBERT J. PERONI,*** & STEPHEN E. 
SHAY**** 
A multinational enterprise (“MNE”) may use cross-border 
earnings stripping as a tax planning strategy. This strategy 
involves a higher-tax affiliate making deductible payments to a 
low- or zero-tax affiliate to reduce the MNE’s global effective tax 
rate and, in the process, erode the corporate tax bases of 
countries where its economic activity otherwise would be more 
highly taxed. Earnings stripping the U.S. corporate tax base is a 
major objective of U.S. corporations that engage in “inversion” 
transactions to become a subsidiary in a foreign-parented group. 
This Article explains how the earnings stripping problem extends 
beyond corporate inversions to U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-
parent groups regardless of how the group was formed and is 
independent of the controversy regarding whether the United 
States should adopt a territorial system. The Article develops a 
theoretical framework for analyzing earnings stripping and 
identifying the scope of an appropriate response. The Article 
further grapples with developing workable rules to implement its 
theoretical policy prescriptions. The Article’s analysis supports 
limiting the deductibility of cross-border interest payments by a 
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U.S. subsidiary with respect to intra-MNE debt to the 
subsidiary’s proportionate share of the MNE’s worldwide debt 
owed to unrelated parties. The Article’s analysis also supports 
treating the proper taxation of cross-border services fees as 
primarily a transfer pricing issue but justifies a source 
withholding tax as a device for dividing revenue between the 
source and residence countries. Finally, the Article advances 
understanding of the proper taxation of royalties paid by a U.S. 
subsidiary to a foreign member of an MNE but concludes that 
the ultimate resolution of that issue requires further work. 
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A multinational enterprise (“MNE”) may use cross-border 
earnings stripping as a tax planning strategy. This strategy involves a 
higher-tax affiliate making deductible payments to a low- or zero-tax 
affiliate to reduce the MNE’s global effective tax rate and, in the 
process, erode the corporate tax bases of countries where its 
economic activity otherwise would be more highly taxed. Earnings 
stripping the U.S. corporate tax base is a major objective of U.S. 
corporations that engage in an “inversion” transaction to become a 
subsidiary in a foreign-parented group, thus allowing the deductible 
payments strategy to work without running afoul of U.S. anti-
avoidance rules in Subpart F1 and other provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code.2 This is because the deductible payments save tax by 
shifting U.S.-source income to low-tax countries, and corporate 
inversions are an effective way to create the U.S. subsidiary/foreign 
parent structure that makes the deductible payments possible. Hence, 
most of the current discussion of earnings stripping occurs in the 
context of how to tackle the inversion problem. 
In this Article, we explain that although earnings stripping is 
appropriately an important part of the inversion conversation, it has 
 
 1. See generally I.R.C. §§ 951–64 (2012) (detailing the anti-deferral rules relating to 
controlled foreign corporations). 
 2. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(j) (2012) (containing earnings stripping deduction 
limitations only for interest payments and only if certain triggers are met, discussed infra 
text accompanying notes 206–27). 
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additional critical effects. Those effects extend beyond corporate 
inversions to U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-parented groups regardless 
of how the group was formed. Those effects will continue to present a 
broad challenge to the U.S. system for taxing cross-border income 
even if inversions are curtailed. This Article also explains that 
earnings stripping is a threat to the U.S. tax base regardless of 
whether the United States (1) adopts a real worldwide income tax 
system that eschews deferral and substantial cross-crediting, (2) 
adopts an explicit territorial system, or (3) continues with its present 
bollixed system that appears to be a worldwide system but largely 
functions as an unduly complex, incoherent, and elective de facto 
territorial regime. Thus, the unresolved controversy regarding overall 
system design is not a reason to postpone developing remedies for the 
earnings stripping problem. 
To identify appropriate remedies, however, it is first necessary to 
determine what is objectionable about earnings stripping, and that 
quest is inhibited by the fact that U.S.-source taxation, to which 
earnings stripping is a threat, is an under-theorized topic. 
Consequently, this Article develops a theoretical framework for 
analyzing earnings stripping and identifying the scope of an 
appropriate response to the earnings stripping problem. The Article 
then considers workable and policy-relevant ways to implement its 
theoretical prescriptions. In our judgment, the likelihood of the 
emergence of an effective multilateral approach to earnings stripping 
is remote. Thus, the United States must develop appropriate rules in 
light of its own tax system and interests, although seeking 
international cooperation in areas where it can be achieved will 
certainly further those interests. 
The Article proceeds in Part I by providing a background that 
gives context to the earnings stripping issue both within and beyond 
the corporate inversion problem. Part II develops a theoretical 
framework for determining both the detriments of earnings stripping 
and the appropriate responses. Part III then confronts the problem of 
translating theoretical analysis into workable, real-world solutions. 
Part IV addresses the question of whether revenue realities allow us 
to ignore the earnings stripping problem and argues that they do not.  
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I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Real Worldwide Taxation Revisited 
In our prior work,3 we have argued that the United States should 
adopt a real worldwide system for taxing the foreign income of a U.S. 
MNE.4 Under a real worldwide system, the foreign-source and U.S.-
source income of a U.S. parent corporation and all of its controlled 
foreign subsidiaries would be aggregated and subjected to a current, 
non-deferred U.S. income tax with a credit for foreign income tax 
paid thereon to the extent that the foreign tax did not exceed the 
applicable U.S. tax. In addition, foreign tax imposed by high-tax 
foreign countries in excess of U.S. tax could not be cross-credited 
against the U.S. residual tax on income earned in low-tax foreign 
countries. This approach would greatly ameliorate distortion of the 
choice between the United States and low-tax foreign countries as the 
location for business or investment activity,5 would end the so-called 
lockout effect of current law,6 would align U.S. international income 
taxation more closely with the ability-to-pay principle that underlies 
the choice of income as the primary U.S. federal tax base,7 and would 
 
 3. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Perspectives 
on the Worldwide vs. Territorial Taxation Debate, 125 TAX NOTES 1079, 1081 (2009) 
[hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives]; Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, 
Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Income Tax on 
Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455, 458 (1999) [hereinafter Peroni, Fleming & 
Shay, Getting Serious]. 
 4. The most basic MNEs are a parent/subsidiary structure or a pair of corporations 
whose stock is owned by the same party or parties (i.e., the brother/sister structure). There 
are virtually endless combinations and permutations of these basic patterns. For purposes 
of this Article, an MNE is a parent/subsidiary group of corporations that functions as an 
economic unit with at least one member being engaged in business activity outside the 
country in which the MNE parent is a resident for tax purposes.  
 5. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR TAXING U.S. MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS 20 (2013) [hereinafter CBO, OPTIONS]; STAFF OF J. COMM. ON 
TAXATION, JCX-42-11, PRESENT LAW AND ISSUES IN U.S. TAXATION OF CROSS-
BORDER INCOME 103 (2011) [hereinafter J. COMM., CROSS-BORDER INCOME]; Fleming, 
Peroni & Shay, Perspectives, supra note 3, at 1084–85. 
 6. See CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 5, at 20; J. COMM., CROSS-BORDER INCOME, 
supra note 5, at 103; J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Eviscerating the Foreign 
Tax Credit Limitations and Cutting the Repatriation Tax – What’s ETI Repeal Got to Do 
with It?, 104 TAX NOTES 1393, 1406, 1414 (2004) [hereinafter Fleming & Peroni, 
Eviscerating]. 
 7. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives, supra note 3, at 1091–1101; J. Clifton 
Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in International Taxation: The 
Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299, 328–33 (2001) 
[hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness]; see also AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING 
THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE 8–15 (2013) (tracing the rise of the ability-to-
pay concept as a fundamental pillar of taxation in the United States). 
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allow the United States to collect a residual tax8 on income earned by 
U.S. MNEs in low-tax foreign countries at a time when the U.S. 
Treasury is in need of increased revenue. Stiff resistance to achieving 
these goals comes from opponents who seek to exclude foreign-
source business income from the U.S. tax base, and a lively and 
important debate has resulted.9 
B. Corporate Inversions 
Among the arguments made by opponents of the real worldwide 
taxation that we propose is that U.S. MNEs could readily defeat such 
a regime by reorganizing into foreign-controlled MNEs—a tactic 
referred to as corporate inversion.10 The United States partially 
addressed this concern with the enactment of statutory rules 
discouraging inversions in 2004.11 While these rules have had a 
substantial restrictive effect,12 in recent years U.S. MNEs have sought 
to avoid the most burdensome aspect of those rules by merging with 
 
 8. A residual tax is the U.S. income tax liability that exceeds any allowable credit for 
foreign income tax payments on foreign-source income. 
 9. See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Old Rules and New Realities: 
Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting, 75 NAT’L TAX J. 937, 957 (2004); BUSINESS 
ROUNDTABLE & BUSINESS COUNCIL, POLICY BURDENS INHIBITING ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 17–18 (June 21, 2010), available at http://businessroundtable.org/sites/ 
default/files/20100621_Letter_to_OMB_Director_Orszag_from_BRT_and_BC_with_Atta
chments.pdf; J.D. Foster & Curtis S. Dubay, Obama International Tax Plan Would 
Weaken Global Competitiveness, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 5, 2009), 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/05/Obama-International-Tax-Plan-
Would-Weaken-Global-Competitiveness; see also J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni 
& Stephen E. Shay, Designing a U.S. Exemption System for Foreign Income When the 
Treasury is Empty, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 397, 426–27 (2012) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & 
Shay, Designing] (arguing that if the U.S. international income system is reworked into an 
exemption or territorial system, it should be designed to protect revenue); Daniel N. 
Shaviro, Evaluating the Case for 1986-Style Corporate Tax Reform, 145 TAX NOTES 1267, 
1274 (2014) (“[A]t present there is ‘no evidence’ to support assertions that U.S. companies 
generally face higher effective tax rates, whether by reason of the higher statutory rate or 
having a nominally worldwide system for taxing foreign source income.”). 
 10. See Eric Solomon, Corporate Inversions: A Symptom of Larger Tax System 
Problems, 136 TAX NOTES 1449, 1449 (2012). 
 11. See I.R.C. § 7874 (2012); Martin A. Sullivan, Lessons from the Last War on 
Inversions, 143 TAX NOTES 861, 861 (2014); Bret Wells, Corporate Inversions and Whack-
a-Mole Tax Policy, 143 TAX NOTES 1429, 1429–32 (2014) [hereinafter Wells, Whack-a-
Mole]. 
 12. See Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99, 
160–61 (2011) [hereinafter Kleinbard, Lessons]; Lee A. Sheppard, Inversions Continue, 
but Are More Difficult, 141 TAX NOTES 355, 355 (2013) [hereinafter Sheppard, Inversions 
Continue]. 
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foreign corporations,13 and there has been considerable discussion 
regarding the appropriate response.14 
A major reason for U.S. MNEs to invert is to create large 
amounts of debt owed to foreign related parties and then to erode the 
U.S. income tax base by means of deductible interest payments on 
that debt, a maneuver included under the rubric of earnings 
stripping.15 We have argued for broadening the definition of U.S. 
corporate tax residence, which would have a restraining effect on this 
tactic.16 This argument, however, is not a complete response because 
the untoward effects of earnings stripping, which we describe below, 
are not dependent on the existence of an inverted corporation but 
 
 13. See DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
CORPORATE EXPATRIATION, INVERSIONS, AND MERGERS: TAX ISSUES 10–11 (2014); 
Mindy Herzfeld, What’s Next in Inversion Land?, 143 TAX NOTES 1225, 1226–27 (2014); 
Sheppard, Inversions Continue, supra note 12, at 355; Wells, Whack-a-Mole, supra note 11, 
at 1432. 
 14. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS 37–38 (2015) [hereinafter 
U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS]; Lindsey McPherson & Andrew Velarde, 
Democrats Disagree on Legislative Fix for Inversions, 143 TAX NOTES 876, 876–77 (2014); 
Stephen E. Shay, Mr. Secretary, Take the Tax Juice Out of Corporate Expatriations, 144 
TAX NOTES 473, 479 (2014) [hereinafter Shay, Mr. Secretary]; Martin A. Sullivan, Short-
Term Inversion Fix May Be Necessary, 143 TAX NOTES 1090, 1092 (2014); Andrew 
Velarde & Lindsey McPherson, Schumer Seeks Interest Deduction Limit for Inverters, 144 
TAX NOTES 379, 379–80 (2014). 
 15. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING, TRANSFER PRICING AND U.S. 
INCOME TAX TREATIES 21–22 (2007) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS 
STRIPPING]; Dana Mattioli, Acquirers Plot Escape from a Turn on Taxes, WALL ST. J., 
July 7, 2014, at C1, C2 (quoting Kevin Rinker, a partner at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, as 
saying, “Because the [tax] benefit the buyer will get from an inversion is so important to a 
deal, if there were a change in [tax] law, the original price wouldn’t make sense for the 
acquirer”). As stated by Willard Taylor: 
Inversions are not, and never were, solely about voting-with-your feet, or electing 
into, an exemption system of taxation for foreign business income. . . . A dollar 
earned in the United States is taxed at a 35% rate but if paid as interest to the new 
Irish parent is taxed at a 12.5% rate at most (and is not subject to withholding 
under the U.S.-Ireland Treaty). This has little to do with whether or not the 
United States adopts an exemption or territorial system . . . . 
Willard B. Taylor, Letter to the Editor, A Comment on Eric Solomon’s Article on 
Corporate Inversions, 137 TAX NOTES 105, 105 (2012). This Article only addresses 
earnings stripping in a cross-border context. Earnings stripping techniques also may be 
used in connection with tax-exempt taxpayers, taxpayers with carryover losses, and in 
other contexts, each of which would require separate technical and policy analyses that are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 16. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Formulary 
Apportionment in the U.S. International Income Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 36 
MICH. J. INT’L LAW 1, 7 (2014) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Formulary 
Apportionment]; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives, supra note 3, at 1098–1100. 
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also arise in the context of foreign-controlled MNEs that were not 
formed by inverting a U.S. MNE. Consequently, this Article will 
focus on developing an analytical framework for identifying responses 
to the principal earnings stripping strategies, regardless of whether a 
corporate inversion is involved. 
C. Illustrating the Earnings Stripping Challenge to Source Taxation 
Foreign corporations that are not subsidiaries of U.S. 
corporations pay U.S. income tax only on their U.S.-source income 
(with a few limited exceptions).17 Thus, with respect to these 
corporations, the principal revenue challenge is to ensure that their 
U.S.-source income is, in fact, taxed by the United States rather than 
being shifted out of the U.S. tax base by a variety of techniques,18 
including the strategy known as earnings stripping. Example 1 
illustrates this point. 
 
 
 17. See I.R.C. §§ 11(d), 881(a), 882(a), 864(c) (2012). Foreign corporations are subject 
to U.S. income tax on certain specified items of foreign-source income that are effectively 
connected with a trade or business conducted within the United States. See id. 
§§ 864(c)(4), 882(a). As discussed in the text, a U.S. MNE parent of a foreign corporation 
that is a controlled foreign corporation is taxed currently on most interest, dividends, and 
royalties stripped from the United States under the foreign personal holding company 
rules of Subpart F of the Code. See id. §§ 951–52, 954, 957–58. Under the Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”) rules, certain nonparticipating foreign financial 
institutions and nonfinancial foreign entities that fail to comply with specified reporting 
obligations will be subject to withholding on withholdable payments without regard to the 
technical geographical source of the income. See id. §§ 1471–1474. 
 18. Other strategies include aggressive transfer pricing, loss importation, and “double 
dip” financing. These strategies have been targeted with mixed success by several Internal 
Revenue Code provisions. See id. §§ 334(b)(1), 362(e)(1), 482, 1503(d). We do not 
consider in this Article the effect on earnings stripping of structural reforms to the 
corporate income tax. Recent proposals would (i) shift the corporate tax to shareholders, 
see, e.g., ERIC TODER & ALAN D. VIARD, MAJOR SURGERY NEEDED: A CALL FOR 
STRUCTURAL REFORM OF THE U.S. CORPORATE INCOME TAX 1 (2014) (report funded 
by the Peter G. Peterson Foundation), available at http://www.aei.org/publication/major-
surgery-needed-a-call-for-structural-reform-of-the-us-corporate-income-tax/; (ii) convert 
the corporate tax into a form of cash flow consumption tax, see, e.g., ALAN J. AUERBACH, 
A MODERN CORPORATE TAX 9 (2010), available at http://www.hamiltonproject.org/ 
papers/a_modern_corporate_tax/; and (iii) adopt a cost of capital deduction and 
shareholder inclusion in lieu of an interest deduction, see, e.g., EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, 
REHABILITATING THE BUSINESS INCOME TAX 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/rehabilitating_the_business_income_tax1/. Each of 
these proposals remains a work in progress and requires further specification before being 
in a form capable of adoption as legislation. Consideration of whether earnings stripping 
remedies would be necessary in the event of a structural reform of the corporate income 
tax can wait until such a proposal has some serious prospect of being adopted.  
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Example 1: USSub is a U.S. corporation and a wholly owned 
subsidiary of UKCo, a U.K. corporation that manufactures 
precision scientific instruments in the United Kingdom and 
whose shares are predominantly owned by nonresidents of the 
United States. UKCo sells the instruments to USSub, which 
markets them to U.S. customers. To a substantial extent, 
USSub’s operations are financed by loans from UKCo. These 
loans satisfy existing U.S. income tax law criteria for treatment 
as bona fide debt and they result in large market rate interest 
payments by USSub to UKCo. USSub also makes large market 
rate royalty payments to UKCo for the use of important 
marketing intangibles pursuant to contract terms that qualify as 
licenses rather than sales under U.S. income tax law. In 
addition, UKCo receives substantial fees from USSub for 
actually providing various accounting and management services 
from its U.K. offices. Although the fees are set at fair market 
value rates, they are substantially above UKCo’s actual cost of 
furnishing the services. USSub’s interest payments, royalty 
payments, and fees payments are all deductible expenses for 
U.S. income tax purposes19 and have the effect of absorbing 
most of USSub’s income even if no transfer pricing abuse is 
involved, a tactic commonly referred to as “earnings stripping.” 
Consequently, there is no U.S. income tax on most of USSub’s 
profits from sales into the United States.20 Moreover, there is 
no U.S. withholding tax on fees for UKCo’s management 
 
 19. See I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 163(a); see also J. COMM., CROSS-BORDER INCOME, supra 
note 5, at 54 (“A domestic corporation with a foreign parent may reduce the U.S. tax on 
the income derived from its U.S. operations through the payment of deductible amounts 
such as interest, rents, royalties, premiums, and management services fees to the foreign 
parent or other foreign affiliates that are not subject to U.S. tax on the receipt of such 
payments. Generating excessively large U.S. tax deductions in this manner is known as 
‘earnings stripping.’ ”); U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra note 15, at 7 
(“Although payments of other deductible amounts by a U.S. corporation to tax-exempt or 
partially exempt related parties also provide an opportunity to shift income out of a U.S. 
corporation, the use of related-party debt arguably is the most readily available method 
for shifting income out of U.S. corporations.”); Taylor, supra note 15, at 106 (stating that 
proposals to deal with earnings stripping “should not be limited to interest but should also 
consider reinsurance premiums . . . and the treatment of payments to related foreign 
persons for the use of intangible or other property and for off-shore services”). Note that 
because USSub makes actual payments to UKCo, § 267(a)(3) does not prevent USSub 
from deducting the interest payments. See Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3(b)(4), ex.1 (1993). 
 20. UKCo has no U.S. taxable income from its sales to USSub because the sales are 
not made through a U.S. permanent establishment. See Convention for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income 
and on Capital Gains, U.S.-U.K., arts. 5, 7, July 24, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13,161 [hereinafter 
U.S.-U.K. Treaty]. We assume for purposes of this discussion that UKCo is a “qualified 
person” and is entitled to all of the benefits of the United States-United Kingdom Income 
Tax Treaty. See id. at art. 23. 
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services performed from its U.K. headquarters21 and the United 
States-United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty makes the U.S. 
withholding tax inapplicable to USSub’s interest and royalty 
payments to UKCo.22 
With respect to payments by U.S. MNEs to controlled foreign 
corporations, the earnings stripping problem is mitigated by the 
application of the Subpart F foreign personal holding company rules, 
which, when they apply to the income from deductible U.S. payments, 
bring the amounts back into the U.S. tax base.23 Avoiding the Subpart 
F rules in order to engage in U.S. earnings stripping is an important 
reason for corporate expatriations/inversions.24 This clear intersection 
of residence and source taxation highlights a fundamental feature of 
international taxation. Taxation at source plays a critical role in 
protection of the residence tax base in that strong anti-earnings 
stripping rules reduce the incentive for a U.S. corporation to 
expatriate to become a foreign corporation.25 In turn, comprehensive 
residence taxation of worldwide income protects against residents’ 
use of foreign corporations to erode the residence taxation base. 
Without application of the Subpart F foreign personal holding 
company rules, U.S. MNEs would engage in stripping the U.S. tax 
base just as they are stripping foreign tax bases.26 
 
 21. See I.R.C. §§ 862(a)(3), 882(a) (2012). 
 22. See U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 20, at arts. 11, 12. U.S. income tax treaties 
typically follow this pattern. See UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF 
NOVEMBER 15, 2006, arts. 11, 12 [hereinafter 2006 U.S. MODEL], available at 
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/model006.pdf. 
 23. I.R.C. § 954(a), (c); see CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & 
RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 496 (4th 
ed. 2011). For a detailed discussion of the Subpart F provisions of the Code, see 1 JOEL D. 
KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ch. B3 (1992 & Cum. 
Supp. No. 3 2014). 
 24. See Shay, Mr. Secretary, supra note 14, at 474; Taylor, supra note 15, at 105. 
 25. Strong earnings stripping rules interfere with the tactic of a U.S. corporation 
transforming itself into a foreign corporation with a U.S. subsidiary that makes deductible 
payments of interest, services fees, and royalties to the foreign corporation that reduce the 
subsidiary’s U.S. tax base. By limiting these deductible payments and protecting the U.S. 
subsidiary’s U.S. tax base, properly designed earnings stripping rules reduce the tax 
savings to be achieved in the corporate expatriation transaction. 
 26. See COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS: ANNUAL 
REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2011–12, 2012–13, H.C. 716, ¶ 8, Ev 21–Ev 50 (U.K.) 
(containing oral evidence taken from Troy Alstead, Starbucks Global Chief Financial 
Officer; Andrew Cecil, Amazon Director of Public Policy; and Matt Brittin, Google Vice 
President for Sales and Operations, Northern and Central Europe, on Nov. 12, 2012); Lee 
A. Shepperd, Luxembourg Lubricates Income Stripping, 145 TAX NOTES 1071, 1071–72 
(2014); Tom Bergin, Burger King Has Maneuvered to Cut U.S. Tax Bill for Years, 
REUTERS (Sept. 2, 2014), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/02/uk-burger-king-tax-
insight-idUKKBN0GX0AK20140902?feedType=RSS&feedName=GCA-GoogleNewsUK 
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One important principle of tax system design is to not put 
pressure on margins the tax system cannot defend—what might be 
called weak margins.27 Three weak margins in the current 
international tax rules are: corporate residence,28 attributing income 
to a geographic source according to the legal category of the income,29 
and applying an arm’s-length transfer pricing principle in contexts in 
which there is not a reasonably close market benchmark.30 As we will 
demonstrate, earnings stripping tax minimization strategies place 
pressure on tax systems across each of these margins.31 Effective and 
 
(reporting that Burger King had pre-tax losses in Germany for two years on over $500 
million in sales after payments of 5% of the sales turnover to Swiss affiliate); Leslie 
Wayne, Kelly Carr, Marina Walker Guevara, Mar Cabra & Michael Hudson, Leaked 
Documents Expose Global Companies’ Secret Tax Deals in Luxembourg, INT’L 
CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Nov. 5, 2014, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks/leaked-documents-expose-global-companies-
secret-tax-deals-luxembourg (disclosing Luxembourg tax rulings for U.S. and non-U.S. 
MNE structures that shifted profits through earnings stripping and other tax-saving 
maneuvers in Luxembourg that were authorized under the rulings). 
 27. In contrast to the tax system designer/tax policy analyst, the tax planner seeks out 
weak margins in order to exploit them to avoid taxes. The idea of weak margins may be 
attributed in part to Harry Grubert, who emphasizes aligning design of policy instruments 
with the behavioral margins to be affected. See Harry Grubert, Tax Credits, Source Rules, 
Trade, and Electronic Commerce: Behavioral Margins and the Design of International Tax 
Systems, 58 TAX L. REV. 149, 150 (2005). 
 28. In other work, we have suggested directions for strengthening the definition of 
corporate residence, see Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Formulary Apportionment, supra note 
16, at 23, and one of us has very preliminarily explored how to reduce the significance of 
corporate residence in the taxation of shareholders, see Stephen E. Shay, Theory, 
Complications, and Policy: Daniel Shaviro’s Fixing U.S. International Taxation, 9 
JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 104, 106 (2014). Other commentators have explored 
alternative residence tests. See, e.g., Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 
B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1618 (2013) (considering basing U.S. residency on U.S. public listing or 
central management and control in the United States); George K. Yin, Letter to the 
Editor, Stopping Corporate Inversions Sensibly and Legally, 144 TAX NOTES 1087, 1087 
(2014) (suggesting that residence of an enterprise should be based on location of the 
enterprise’s principal customer base). 
 29. See Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, The David 
Tillinghast Lecture “What’s Source Got to Do with It?” Source Rules and U.S. International 
Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 83 (2002) [hereinafter Shay, Fleming & Peroni, What’s 
Source Got to Do with It?]. 
 30. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Formulary Apportionment, supra note 16, at 3; 
Stephen E. Shay, Commentary on Ownership Neutrality and Practical Complications, 62 
TAX L. REV. 317, 327–30 (2009). 
 31. Earnings stripping is also a major target of the G20’s efforts to fight base erosion 
and profit shifting, often referred to as the “BEPS project” or “BEPS plan.” See ORG. FOR 
ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 
15–17 (2013) [hereinafter OECD, ACTION PLAN]; Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 
FLA. TAX REV. 55, 88–91 (2014); Kristin A. Parillo, Amanda Athanasiou, Margaret 
Burow, Ajay Gupta, David D. Stewart & Stephanie Suong Johnston, OECD Releases 
BEPS Report Ahead of G-20 Meeting, 144 TAX NOTES 1347, 1347 (2014). 
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coherent limitations on earnings stripping should reduce that 
pressure. 
The earnings stripping problem shown in Example 1 would be 
even more exigent if the United States adopted a so-called territorial 
system. Such a system would typically employ characterization rules 
and arm’s-length transfer pricing principles to identify foreign-source 
business income of U.S. corporations and would then exclude such 
income from the U.S. tax base.32 In that case, the business income tax 
base for U.S. corporations would be a narrow construct limited to 
U.S.-source business income.33 Erosion of this narrow base through 
earnings stripping would have an even greater impact than if foreign-
source business income of U.S. corporations were included in the 
base under true worldwide taxation or, at a minimum, under more 
robust Subpart F-type anti-avoidance rules. Thus, contrary to the 
arguments made by some proponents of territorial taxation,34 
adoption of a territorial system by the United States will not 
ameliorate the earnings stripping problem and will probably make it 
worse.35 Stated differently, earnings stripping is a discrete issue that 
plagues both worldwide and territorial systems. Consequently, there 
is no good reason that earnings stripping reforms should be deferred 
until the United States determines whether its international income 
tax regime will be comprehensively transformed into a territorial 
system or a real worldwide system.36 
 
 32. See Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 12, at 138 (stating that “a territorial tax system 
means in practice that every country, including the residence country, is just another 
source country”). 
 33. See CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 5, at 3; see also Wells, Whack-a-Mole, supra note 
11, at 1433 (“The U.S. subpart F regime has served as a means to backstop the U.S. tax 
base when this skewed application of our transfer pricing and treaty rules creates 
inappropriate profit-shifting opportunities.”). 
 34. See, e.g., William McBride, Letter to the Editor, Earnings Stripping and the 
Complexity of the Corporate Tax, 144 TAX NOTES 1086, 1086 (2014); Scott A. Hodge, IRS 
Data Contradicts Kleinbard’s Warning of Earnings Stripping Inversions, TAX POL’Y BLOG 
(Sept. 2, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/irs-data-contradicts-Kleinbard-s-warnings-
earnings-stripping-inversions. 
 35. See Edward D. Kleinbard, “Competitiveness” Has Nothing to Do With It, 144 TAX 
NOTES 1055, 1056 (2014); Paul Caron, The Tax Foundation and Ed Kleinbard Debate the 
Impact of Inversions on the Corporate Tax Base, TAX POL’Y BLOG (Sept. 7, 2014), 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/09/tax-foundation.html (providing Kleinbard’s 
response to criticisms raised by Hodge, supra note 34). 
 36. See Martin A. Sullivan, Will Tax Reform Stop Inversions?, 144 TAX NOTES 530, 
531 (2014). 
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D. Aggressive Transfer Pricing Is Not Necessary 
The facts of Example 1 stipulated that USSub’s deductible 
payments to UKCo were all at fair market value rates. Nevertheless, 
the effect of those payments was to move a substantial portion of 
USSub’s U.S.-source income out of the U.S. tax base and into the 
low-tax United Kingdom.37 This fact illustrates the point that while 
aggressive transfer pricing magnifies the base erosion effect of 
earnings stripping (in some cases, greatly so), it is not a necessary 
element of the earnings stripping strategy. Earnings stripping can be 
effectively executed with arm’s-length payments. 
Earnings stripping, in practice, however, is inextricably 
intertwined with transfer pricing rules and tax minimization strategies 
based on those rules. Under accepted interpretations of the arm’s-
length principle, a generous range of prices may be found to be 
“arm’s length.”38 Accordingly, in determining what is an arm’s-length 
payment for an item for which there is not a reliable comparable 
transaction, well-advised taxpayers naturally will adopt a price that is 
at whichever extreme end of the arm’s-length range that yields the 
most favorable after-tax result. So long as that price is within an 
arm’s-length range of prices, the current U.S. transfer pricing 
regulations immunize the pricing from adjustment.39 
There is a further and more intractable transfer pricing problem. 
Transfer pricing rules, like source rules, operate on the basis of legal 
categories.40 When payments are made for intangibles and services in 
a related party context in which the overall enterprise earns economic 
rents, it is possible to apply the transfer pricing rules either to transfer 
a portion of the rents through higher royalties or services payments or 
to leave the rents undisturbed in the income of the company that 
nominally earned the rents. There is no separate legal category for 
economic rents, except, to a limited extent, goodwill (the treatment of 
which from a legal perspective is underdeveloped). Which country is 
entitled to tax the rents is the central question of inter-nation income 
allocation and earnings stripping transfer pricing strategies are a 
flexible tool for taxpayers to use in making their own allocation of 
economic rents. As will be seen below, the problem of which related 
 
 37. In 2015, the U.K. general corporate tax rate will be 20%. William McBride, Tax 
Reform in the UK Reversed the Tide of Corporate Tax Inversions, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 14, 
2014), http://taxfoundation.org/article/tax-reform-uk-reversed-tide-corporate-tax-inversions. 
 38. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(e) (as amended in 2013). 
 39. See id. § 1.482-1(e)(1). 
 40. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 23, at 721–57; 1 KUNTZ & PERONI, 
supra note 23, ¶ A3.01[1]. 
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party should obtain the benefits of economic rents is a confounding 
issue in identifying a theoretically satisfying normative benchmark to 
evaluate earnings stripping. 
E. A Corporate Inversion Is Not Essential 
In Example 1, there are several ways by which USSub might 
have become UKCo’s wholly owned subsidiary. USSub might have 
been a subsidiary created by UKCo to carry on the latter’s U.S. sales 
operation. Alternatively, UKCo and USSub might have been 
historically unrelated parties that came into a parent-subsidiary 
structure through a variety of methods. Generally, if UKCo is larger 
than USSub, UKCo would acquire USSub in an arm’s-length 
transaction. In the current market environment, if USSub is larger 
than UKCo, USSub might engage in a so-called inversion transaction 
in which a new UKCo parent corporation is organized with USSub 
and old UKCo as subsidiaries. USSub would engage in U.S. 
marketing activity for old UKCo.41 Example 1 does not specify which 
of these paths the companies took to position USSub as a UKCo 
subsidiary since that is irrelevant for purposes of this Article. The 
critical point is that regardless of which transactional pattern was used 
to bring about Example 1, a foreign-owned U.S. subsidiary, such as 
USSub, was made available to serve as the facilitator of the earnings 
stripping strategy illustrated in that example. A corollary to this point 
is that restrictions on earnings stripping reduce both the incentive for 
U.S. corporations to invert and the relative advantage for a foreign 
corporation to acquire a U.S. corporation. 
 
 41. There are multiple forms of inversion transactions. For descriptions and 
explanations, see MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 13, at 3–5; DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31444, FIRMS THAT INCORPORATE ABROAD FOR TAX 
PURPOSES: CORPORATE “INVERSIONS” AND “EXPATRIATION” 3–4 (2007); Steven H. 
Goldman, Corporate Expatriation: A Case Analysis, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 71, 73, 74–76 (2008); 
Solomon, supra note 10, at 1204–05; Steven M. Surdell, Inversions 2014—Self Help 
International Tax Reform for U.S. Multinationals?, 92 TAXES 63, 64–80 (2014); Bret Wells, 
Cant and the Inconvenient Truth About Corporate Inversions, 136 TAX NOTES 429, 430–36 
(2012) [hereinafter Wells, Inconvenient Truth]; Bret Wells, What Corporate Inversions 
Teach About International Tax Reform, 127 TAX NOTES 1345, 1349–51 (2010) [hereinafter 
Wells, Corporate Inversions]. 
  There is a large body of literature discussing corporate inversions and the 
legislative and administrative attempts to deal with them. See, e.g., BRUMBAUGH, supra, 
at 6, 9–14; Solomon, supra note 10, at 1206–10; Wells, Inconvenient Truth, supra, at 430–
36; Wells, Corporate Inversions, supra, at 1349–51. Because this Article focuses on the 
earnings stripping problem, which does not require a corporate inversion, see generally J. 
COMM., CROSS-BORDER INCOME, supra note 5, at 50; U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS 
STRIPPING, supra note 15, at 9–10; Taylor, supra note 15, at 105, we do not discuss this 
literature or the details of the corporate inversion topic. 
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F. What’s Bad About Earnings Stripping? 
The preceding discussion leads to the question of exactly why 
earnings stripping is an apt object of tax policy concern. A major 
objection to earnings stripping is that it depletes the U.S. tax base.42 
This is shown in Example 1 where the U.S.-source income of the 
UKCo-USSub MNE was the only portion of that MNE’s worldwide 
income that was potentially taxable by the United States. Yet 
earnings stripping removed most of that income from the reach of the 
U.S. income tax even though the MNE generated the income by 
exploiting the U.S. market.43 
A second objection to earnings stripping arises from the 
preceding point. U.S. resident corporations that compete with UKCo 
in the U.S. market, but that are not subsidiaries of foreign 
corporations, cannot generate income that escapes U.S. taxation 
through earnings stripping. This is so because they have no foreign 
parent to which they can make deductible payments.44 Thus, these 
independent U.S. resident corporations find themselves at a tax-based 
disadvantage in the U.S. market vis-à-vis the UKCo-USSub MNE.45 
The result of this competitive disadvantage is an incentive for 
foreign corporations to create or acquire U.S. corporations, or for 
 
 42. See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra note 15, at 21–23. 
 43. The 2007 U.S. Treasury report on earnings stripping stated that “[t]he effect of 
earnings stripping on the U.S. tax base is unclear, because we cannot accurately quantify 
earnings stripping by [foreign controlled domestic corporations] generally.” Id. at 26. 
Examining a data set of companies that inverted before 2004, the report found clear 
evidence of earnings stripping of U.S. affiliates of foreign companies that inverted. Id. at 
21. The fact that the effect of earnings stripping could not be precisely quantified does not, 
however, mean that the effect is insignificant. The OECD has concluded that the effect of 
earnings stripping on the tax bases of member countries is, indeed, significant. See OECD, 
ACTION PLAN, supra note 31, at 16–17. An important item in the BEPS action plan is Item 
11 (“Establish methodologies to collect and analyze data on BEPS and the actions to 
address it.”), which should lead to improvements in the empirical data on these issues. See 
id. at 21–22. See generally Edoardo Traversa, Interest Deductibility and the BEPS Action 
Plan: nihil novi sub sole?, 2013 BRIT. TAX REV. 607 (2013) (critiquing the portion of the 
Action Plan that deals with intra-group interest payments). 
 44. If a U.S. subsidiary makes deductible interest, royalty, and fees payments to a U.S. 
parent corporation, the deductions are removed from the subsidiary’s taxable income, but 
they remain in the U.S. tax base as income items of the parent corporation. See I.R.C. § 61 
(2012). If a U.S. corporation makes deductible interest, royalty, and fees payments to a 
foreign subsidiary of a U.S. parent corporation, the payments are likely to be included in 
the U.S. tax base as Subpart F income that is currently taxable to the U.S. parent 
corporation as a constructive inclusion. See id. §§ 951–952, 954, 957–958. 
 45. See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra note 15, at 23, 26; see also 
OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 31, at 8 (“[C]orporations that operate only in domestic 
markets, including family-owned businesses or new innovative companies, have difficulty 
competing with MNEs that have the ability to shift their profits across borders to avoid or 
reduce tax.”). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 673 (2015) 
688 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
U.S. corporations to create foreign parent corporations to invert their 
corporate structure, so that the earnings stripping advantage can be 
achieved.46 We see no reason for the United States to provide a 
revenue-losing tax incentive for these corporate formations or 
acquisitions.47 
G. Tax Competition 
To the extent that the earnings stripping limitations in § 163(j) 
are avoided or inapplicable for the reasons discussed later in this 
Article,48 the earnings stripping illustrated in Example 1 allows the 
foreign investor, UKCo, to earn U.S. business income (i.e., earn 
income in the U.S. market) without paying U.S. income tax. This is 
clearly an incentive for UKCo and other foreign corporations to 
invest in U.S. business activity. So might an indulgent U.S. attitude 
towards earnings stripping attract large amounts of foreign 
investment that would produce a prodigious U.S. business expansion? 
Would this, in turn, yield domestic economic benefits sufficient to 
more than pay for the Treasury’s revenue loss resulting from a zero 
U.S. tax on the stripped income? A full answer to these questions 
would require a separate article that reviews the extensive literature 
regarding whether tax competition does or does not produce 
sufficient benefits to warrant low or zero tax rates. This literature is, 
at best, mixed regarding the effects of tax competition.49 Moreover, 
 
 46. See Wells, Whack-a-Mole, supra note 11, at 1432. 
 47. See generally Kimberly A. Clausing, Should Tax Policy Target Multinational Firm 
Headquarters?, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 741, 761 (2010) (discussing several disadvantages to these 
types of tax incentives). 
 48. The significantly limited coverage of § 163(j) and the substantial avoidance 
opportunities that result are discussed infra Part III.B. 
 49. Indeed, in many cases it will be unclear whether the optimal response to a tax rate 
change by one country is for another country to increase or decrease its tax rate. As stated 
by two commentators: 
Intuition might suggest, in particular, that the best response to a reduction in some 
other country’s tax rate will be for [country] i to reduce its own rate too; meaning 
that tax rates are strategic complements. But this is not, in general, assured (even 
in the case of symmetric countries). A lower tax rate in some other country j, for 
instance, moves capital out of country i, and so reduces its tax revenue and public 
spending; whether the best response to this is for i to raise or lower its tax rate 
depends, among other things, on how large an increase in the marginal value of 
public spending this implies (being more likely the greater is that increase). 
Michael Keen & Kai Konrad, The Theory of International Tax Competition and 
Coordination, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 258, 267–68 (2013). A cynic might 
argue that if a country does not know the correct sign of the response, tax competition 
either is truly stupid or is a consequence of capture by interested parties. See INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, SPILLOVERS IN INT’L CORPORATE TAXATION 21–23 (2014) 
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the investment capital that tax competition seeks to attract is already 
abundantly available in the United States.50 Consequently, we will not 
engage in a lengthy detour into the tax competition debate. For 
present purposes, we will assume, we believe realistically, that the 
Treasury’s revenue loss from earnings stripping will not yield a more-
than-compensatory cornucopia of benefits. 
The old-fashioned form of tax competition involved tax increases 
in the form of tariffs instead of tax subsidies.51 In developing 
appropriate constraints on earnings stripping we are mindful that we 
do not want to turn to protectionism of U.S.-produced goods and 
services. Defense of the U.S. income tax base is not in any way 
protectionism, however. As shown above, it serves as a constraint on 
both U.S. as well as foreign resident taxpayers. Moreover, unlike a 
tariff that is imposed only on foreign producers, an income tax policy 
directed at moving toward neutral taxation of U.S. and non-U.S. 
controlled taxpayers should reduce, not increase, economic 
distortions. Under the principles we develop below, normal market 
returns are respected for foreign as well as U.S. business activity. 
H. Does the United States Have a Normative Source Taxation Right? 
The purpose of this Article is to explore ways to eliminate or 
reduce the benefits of earnings stripping by the UKCo-USSub MNE 
in Example 1 and similarly situated foreign enterprises that sell into 
the U.S. market. This purpose assumes, of course, that the United 
States has a normative right to tax the U.S.-source income of the 
UKCo-USSub MNE. We have addressed that question in prior work 
 
[hereinafter IMF, SPILLOVERS] (stating that alleged benefits of tax competition “generate 
heated dispute, but remain essentially uninformed by empirical knowledge”); see also 
Thushyanthan Baskaran & Mariana Lopes de Fonseca, The Economics and Empirics of 
Tax Competition: A Survey and Lessons for the EU, 7 ERASMUS L. REV. 3, 3–12 (2014) 
(surveying the economics literature on tax competition and concluding that it is ambiguous 
regarding whether or not tax competition causes a race to the bottom). 
 50. This is evidenced at present by the very low U.S. interest rates reported regularly 
in the financial press, see, e.g., Biggest 1,000 Stocks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2014, at C6; Ben 
Edwards, Apple’s Euro Bond Sells at Record-Low Rate, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2014, at C8, 
and by frequent financial press stories regarding the large cash accumulations of U.S. 
corporations, see, e.g., Theo Francis & Ted Mann, An Irony of U.S. Policy: Record Cash, 
Record Debt, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2014, at B1; Vipal Monga, New Rules, New Puzzle: 
Where to Stash the Cash?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2014, at B1. These low interest rates also 
facilitate funding of the federal budget deficit. If interest rates increase during a period of 
continued U.S. budget deficits, the negative impact of the revenue loss would be 
exacerbated. 
 51. See HARRY G. BRAINARD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 
93–103 (1954); Yariv Brauner, International Tax and Trade Agreements May Be 
Coordinated, but Not Reconciled, 25 VA. TAX REV. 251, 253 (2005). 
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and explained that the United States does, indeed, have such a right 
based on a benefits rationale, on the right of a nation-state to 
determine the conditions for access to its economy by nonresidents, 
and on considerations of fairness to its own residents who compete in 
the U.S. domestic economy against nonresidents.52 Moreover, the 
right of a country to tax nonresidents on income earned within its 
borders is well established as a principle of customary international 
law.53 Thus, it is appropriate for the United States to address the 
earnings stripping strategy illustrated in Example 1. 
I. Should the Focus Be Limited to Inversions and Interest 
Payments? 
As shown in Example 1, earnings stripping can take place 
without being connected with a corporate inversion, and earnings 
stripping can be accomplished by means of royalty and services fees 
payments in addition to interest payments. Nevertheless, the 2007 
Treasury report on earnings stripping seemed to endorse the view 
that because (1) “the use of related-party debt arguably is the most 
readily available method of shifting income out of U.S. 
corporations,”54 (2) the “data on . . . [inverted corporations] strongly 
suggests that these corporations are shifting substantially all of their 
income out of the United States, primarily through interest 
 
 52. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, What’s Source Got to Do with It?, supra note 29, at 
88–106. Professor Daniel Shaviro has argued that purely as a prudential matter, “zero is 
likely to be the optimal U.S. tax rate for truly inbound investment earning a merely 
normal rate of return which the [foreign] investors could and would match elsewhere.” 
Shaviro, supra note 9, at 1273. This statement, however, assumes that the relevant foreign 
countries tax their residents’ U.S.-source income at a positive rate without allowing an 
adequate credit for U.S. income tax. See id. In reality, the major trading partners of the 
United States generally address U.S.-source business income by either exempting it or 
taxing it with a full foreign tax credit for U.S. tax, and they generally deal with U.S.-source 
investment income by taxing it and allowing a full foreign tax credit for U.S. tax. 
Moreover, Professor Shaviro’s quoted statement does not challenge the normative case for 
U.S. taxation of U.S.-source income earned by foreign persons.  
 53. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 411–12 (1986); REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 27 (2007) 
[hereinafter AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW]; Kim Brooks, 
Global Distributive Justice: The Potential for a Feminist Analysis of International Tax 
Revenue Allocation, 21 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 267, 280 (2009); Michael S. Kirsch, The Role 
of Physical Presence in the Taxation of Cross-Border Personal Services, 51 B.C. L. REV. 
993, 999 (2010). For a discussion of the connection between source-based taxation and the 
international law concept of sovereignty, see Diane M. Ring, What’s at Stake in the 
Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 155, 157–
233 (2008). 
 54. U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra note 15, at 7. 
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payments,”55 and (3) “the Treasury Department is unable to quantify 
accurately the extent of earnings stripping [by U.S. subsidiaries 
outside of the inversion setting],”56 earnings stripping reforms should 
focus on interest deductions in the inversion scenario and action 
regarding other payments and scenarios should be deferred until 
further data is gathered.57 
This view strikes us as unsatisfactory because the Treasury report 
also recognized that deductible payments other than interest can be 
used for earnings stripping58 and that “opportunities for earnings 
stripping are not limited to inversion transactions . . . [but] are present 
in cases where a U.S. business is structured from the outset with a 
foreign parent and in cases where a foreign corporation acquires a 
U.S. operating group.”59 Moreover, the aggressive behavior of 
corporations in using other tactics to shift profits out of the U.S. tax 
base60 ipso facto suggests that earnings stripping is surely being 
employed for the same purpose in scenarios other than corporate 
inversions even if the confirming data has not yet been collected.61 
 
 55. Id. at 21; see also Jim A. Seida & William F. Wempe, Effective Tax Rate Changes 
and Earnings Stripping Following Corporate Inversion, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 805, 825 (2004) 
(finding that “a typical inversion firm experiences an 11.6 percentage point reduction in its 
effective tax rate . . . [and that a] large portion of the reduction is attributable to the 
stripping of U.S. earnings via intercompany interest payments”). 
 56. U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra note 15, at 26. 
 57. Id. at 29, 31. 
 58. Id. at 7. 
 59. Id. at 29; see also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111ST CONG., PRESENT 
LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATED TO POSSIBLE INCOME SHIFTING AND TRANSFER 
PRICING, JCX-37-2010, at 108–09 (Comm. Print 2010) [hereinafter JOINT COMM., INCOME 
SHIFTING AND TRANSFER PRICING]. 
 60. See Harry Grubert, Foreign Taxes and the Growing Share of Multinational 
Company Income Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, Are Being Globalized, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 247, 
274 (2012); Martin A. Sullivan, Pfizer’s Tax Picture Dominated by U.S. Losses, 
Repatriation, 140 TAX NOTES 103, 105–10 (2013); Martin A. Sullivan, Transfer Pricing 
Abuse Is Job-Killing Corporate Welfare, 128 TAX NOTES 461, 461 (2010); Martin A. 
Sullivan, U.S. Multinationals Paying Less Foreign Tax, 118 TAX NOTES 1177, 1177–83 
(2008); Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Multinationals Shifting Profits Out of the United States, 
118 TAX NOTES 1078, 1078 (2008); see also U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING, 
supra note 15, at 55–61; Transfer Pricing Issues: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & 
Means, 111th Cong. 1–6 (2010) (statement of Stephen E. Shay, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Int’l Tax Affairs, U.S. Treasury Dep’t) (updating data reported in 2007 study and 
finding substantial income shifting to lower-tax countries, including evidence from 
company tax data of margin increases correlated inversely with effective tax rates). 
 61. We agree with the following analysis by the Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation: 
[S]ome argue that, as a matter of tax policy, the earnings stripping rules should be 
strengthened for all foreign-controlled domestic corporations (including 
expatriated entities) because they all have the same incentives and capabilities to 
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The recent ScottishPower62 case is illustrative. ScottishPower 
PLC structured its 1999 acquisition of PacifiCorp for $6.5 billion (and 
assumption of debt) to insert $4.896 billion of fixed and floating rate 
intra-MNE debt into the U.S. acquisition entity (resulting in 
approximately a 3:1 debt to equity ratio).63 The Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”) lost its challenge to the deduction of $932 million of 
interest paid over three tax years, 2001 to 2003.64 As another example, 
in 2009, the IRS withdrew its challenge to the deduction of interest 
paid on $13.5 billion of intra-MNE debt between GlaxoSmithKline 
Holdings (Americas) Inc. and a Swiss affiliate.65 Neither of these 
cases involved inversions and many more examples could be 
adduced.66 Consequently, we conclude that consideration of earnings 
stripping reforms should not be limited to interest payments that are 
connected with corporate inversions. Moreover, consideration should 
be given to protecting the U.S. tax base from other types of earnings 
stripping deductible payments (such as royalties and services fees) 
made to both related parties and tax indifferent third parties.67 
Reform, however, requires identification of an underlying policy 
and that policy cannot be ascertained until a theoretical baseline is 
established. Part II deals with that matter. 
 
erode the U.S. tax base, and may do so in the same manner. . . . Proponents of 
stricter across-the-board earnings stripping rules also argue that there is sufficient 
evidence of earnings stripping to justify implementing such a regime, and that 
significant erosion of the U.S. tax base will continue until earnings stripping rules 
are strengthened for all foreign-controlled domestic corporations. 
J. COMM., CROSS-BORDER INCOME, supra note 5, at 61. 
 62. NA Gen. P’ship & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1916 (2012). 
 63. See id. at 1917. 
 64. See id. at 1919, 1924. 
 65. See Stipulation, GlaxoSmithKline Holdings (Americas) Inc. v. Comm’r., Nos. 
18940-08, 18941-08 (T.C. Nov. 19, 2009). 
 66. For example, reportedly, 20% to 30% of all large cases open at the end of 2012 
involved a debt-equity classification issue. Andrew Velarde, Recent IRS Litigation Presents 
Opportunities for Taxpayers in Debt-Equity Cases, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 15, 2013, 
available at LEXIS, 2013 TNT 221-4. 
 67. See, e.g., Sven-Olof Lodin, Intragroup Royalties As a Vehicle for International Tax 
Arbitrage, 71 TAX NOTES INT’L 1317, 1318 (2013) [hereinafter Lodin II] (“Most countries 
have introduced limitations of the total interest cost deductible. . . . This reduction of the 
room for using interest payments for income shifting has meant that other income-shifting 
methods are expected to be used more frequently. Royalty payments have become the 
fastest-growing substitute method for profit shifting.”); Taylor, supra note 15, at 106 
(“ ‘Earnings stripping’ in this context should not be limited to interest but should also 
consider reinsurance premiums . . . and the treatment of payments to related foreign 
persons for the use of intangible or other property and for off-shore services.”). 
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II.  ESTABLISHING THE POLICY BASELINE 
A. The Need for a Policy Baseline 
The principal U.S. tool for restraining cross-border earnings 
stripping is § 163(j) of the Code. This provision, in highly simplified 
terms, limits a U.S. corporation’s current deduction for interest 
payments to related parties if the U.S. withholding tax rate on the 
payments is subject to a treaty reduction and if the U.S. corporation 
has a year-end debt-to-equity ratio greater than 1.5 to 1.68 However, 
the deduction limitation applies only to the excess of the 
corporation’s net interest expense over 50% of its adjusted taxable 
income (i.e., taxable income calculated without taking net interest 
expense and certain other items into account),69 and the amount 
disallowed is carried forward to later taxable years.70 Section 163(j) 
does not affect corporations that can either keep their aggregate debt 
within the 1.5 to 1 ratio or keep their net interest expense below 50% 
of adjusted taxable income.71 Moreover, importantly, § 163(j) does 
not apply to other deductible payments, including royalties and 
services fees, made by a U.S. corporation to a related party.72 In 
addition, it is difficult to discern any coherent theory underlying 
§ 163(j) tests for determining when to allow a deduction for interest 
paid to related parties. Thus, § 163(j), in its current form, is both 
under-theorized and not very effective in restraining earnings 
stripping. Although § 163(j) also applies to interest paid to tax-
exempt organizations,73 our focus is on the theoretical basis to combat 
cross-border earnings stripping. 
 
 68. See I.R.C. § 163(j)(1)-(3) (2012). 
 69. A body of case law allows the IRS to re-characterize nominal corporate debt as an 
equity investment and to deny any deduction for interest payments on such debt. See, e.g., 
Philip G. Cohen, Testing for Thin Capitalization Under Section 163(j): A Flawed Safe 
Harbor, 67 TAX LAW. 67, 77–81 (2013); David C. Garlock & Amin N. Khalaf, Debt vs. 
Equity: Myths, Best Practices and Practical Considerations for U.S. Tax Aspects of Related-
Party Financings, TAXES, Aug. 2014, at 35, 36–49; William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal 
Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. 
REV. 369, 370 (1971). However, when the formalities of debt are observed between the 
parties, this case law has allowed highly leveraged debtor corporations to deduct interest 
on related party debt. See Baker Commodities, Inc. v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 374, 401 (1967) 
(upholding debtor corporation’s interest deductions in spite of 700:1 debt-equity ratio), 
aff’d, 415 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 988 (1970). This case law has not 
been effective in restraining earnings stripping. See generally NA Gen. P’ship & 
Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M 1916 (2012). 
 70. See I.R.C. § 163(j)(1)(B). 
 71. See id. § 163(j)(1), (2)(A)–(B). 
 72. See id. § 163(j)(1)(A). 
 73. See id. § 163(j)(3)(A). 
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For those concerned about earnings stripping, a seemingly 
obvious reform strategy might be to make § 163(j) less generous by 
extending it to royalty and services fees payments made to foreign 
related parties and by tightening the 50% of adjusted taxable income 
and 1.5 to 1 debt to equity benchmarks. We will examine those 
possibilities in Part III.B of this Article. Before we can do that, 
however, we must first deal with certain difficult foundational 
questions. What is the normative basis for limiting earnings stripping 
deductions? Should the limitations be less generous than current 
§ 163(j), and to what extent? What is the correct degree of limitation 
on deductions for payments to related foreign parties? To answer 
those questions, it will be helpful to establish a policy baseline and 
develop a theoretically coherent approach for restraining earnings 
stripping. The remainder of Part II addresses that topic.74 
B. The No Deduction for Costless Payments Principle 
Example 2 provides a useful place to begin by considering 
unrelated party financing. 
Example 2: USCo, a U.S. corporation, borrows at a 10% per 
annum interest charge from an unrelated foreign bank and 
invests the proceeds in a U.S. business activity that yields a 10% 
annual return. Obviously, this produces an economic wash; the 
interest charge on the loan exactly equals the investment 
return, which means that there is no gain or loss because the 
interest charge is a cost of pursuing USCo’s business activity 
that must be taken into account to properly measure USCo’s 
economic result. Therefore, a tax deduction must be allowed 
for the interest charge so that USCo’s tax result will reflect 
economic reality. The same point applies to royalty payments 
and services payments that USCo makes to unrelated parties. 
These conclusions are based on the fact that the U.S. income 
tax is a levy on net income.75 Thus, when business-connected 
interest payments,76 royalty payments, and services payments 
 
 74. The general background rule of the Internal Revenue Code is that capital 
expenditures are not currently deductible unless an exception applies. See id. § 263(a)(1); 
JOSEPH M. DODGE, J. CLIFTON FLEMING, JR. & ROBERT J. PERONI, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 43–48 (4th ed. 2012). Thus, in the remainder 
of this Article, all expenditures identified as deductible are assumed to be current 
expenses and not capital expenditures. 
 75. See I.R.C. § 63 (defining taxable income as net income). See generally id. § 1 
(using the taxable income of individuals to determine tax levy due); id. § 11(a) (using the 
taxable income of corporations to determine tax levy due). 
 76. See H. David Rosenbloom, Banes of an Income Tax: Legal Fictions, Elections, 
Hypothetical Determinations and Related-Party Debt, 32 TAX NOTES INT’L 989, 997–98 
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are made to independent payees, they should be deducted for 
income tax purposes because they are costs of earning income 
and the income tax base cannot be properly measured unless 
these costs are subtracted. 
Now compare that fact scenario with Example 3 where a third-
party lender is not involved. 
Example 3: USSub is a wholly owned U.S. subsidiary of UKCo, 
a U.K. corporation with no external debt. USSub borrows funds 
representing retained earnings from UKCo at 10% and invests 
the proceeds in a U.S. business activity that yields a 10% annual 
return. In this situation, if a deduction were allowed, it would 
disguise the fact that the MNE’s U.S. activity yielded a 10% 
return that effectively has been internally allocated from 
USSub to UKCo by means of interest payments that do not 
reflect a real offsetting interest expense.77 Stated differently, the 
interest payment is not an expense that produces an economic 
wash in relation to the U.S. income tax base; it effectively is a 
distribution of income within the UKCo-USSub MNE. 
Considered this way, USSub should not be allowed to deduct its 
interest payments to UKCo because they effectively are 
distributions in respect of equity. 
1.  Real Expenses vs. Costless Foreign Related Party Payments 
If UKCo borrowed from an independent party to obtain the 
funds to loan to USSub in Example 3, then the interest paid to the 
independent lender would be a real cost rather than an internal 
 
(2003) (“[I]nterest is generally deductible in the unrelated party context because it is a 
legitimate cost of the funds needed to operate a business.”); Jonathan Talisman, Do No 
Harm: Keep Corporate Interest Fully Deductible, 141 TAX NOTES 211, 211–12 (2013) 
[hereinafter Talisman, Do No Harm]. See generally AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX PROJECT: REPORTER’S STUDY DRAFT: SUBCHAPTER C (SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY) 
80–83 (June 1, 1989) [hereinafter ALI, SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY] (explaining the need for a 
corporate interest deduction with respect to unrelated party debt). 
 77. See IMF, SPILLOVERS, supra note 49, at 30 (explaining that intra-MNE interest 
payments are a method for shifting profits to low-tax countries and concluding that “[i]t is 
reasonable to ask why, in principle, any deduction at all should be given for interest paid 
to related parties”). As stated by H. David Rosenbloom: 
[R]elated-party debt [interest] is generally not compensation for money lent from 
one person to another. Rather it is a transfer of funds from one incorporated 
pocket to another. . . . As noted, interest is generally deductible in the unrelated-
party context because it is a legitimate cost of the funds needed to operate a 
business. The application of this rationale in a related-party context, where no 
funds are being raised, is one of the tax miracles of our time. 
Rosenbloom, supra note 76, at 997–98; see also Johanna Hey, Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting and Interest Expenditure, 68 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 332, 342 (2014). 
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distribution. Thus, to that extent, USSub’s interest payments to 
UKCo would be reimbursements for a real cost. If the real cost is 
attributable to U.S. business activity, which we assume at this stage of 
the discussion, the reimbursed cost should be a deductible expense for 
U.S. tax purposes in determining the U.S. taxable income of the 
UKCo-USSub MNE.78 Likewise, USSub should be allowed to deduct 
royalty payments to UKCo to the extent they reimburse UKCo for 
the cost of developing its own intangibles or for the cost of acquiring 
the use of unrelated party intangibles that UKCo sublicenses to 
USSub and that USSub actually uses in its business. Finally, UKCo’s 
actual labor costs incurred in providing management services from its 
headquarters to USSub should also be deductible for U.S. tax 
purposes, assuming that they benefit the U.S. business, because these 
are real expenses rather than internal income distributions. These 
conclusions do not, however, apply to amounts charged to USSub in 
excess of UKCo’s actual intangible development and acquisition costs 
and actual labor costs, without regard to whether the charges exceed 
an arm’s-length amount. 
One might protest that even if USSub’s payments to UKCo do 
no more than reimburse UKCo for actual expenses incurred in 
transactions with third parties for USSub’s benefit, they nevertheless 
erode the U.S. tax base if they are treated as deductible. Speaking 
generally, however, the U.S. tax base is not gross income; it is net 
income (i.e., gross income minus the expenditures allowed as a 
deduction).79 USSub’s reimbursement payments to UKCo are real 
costs to the UKCo-USSub MNE of producing income through 
activity in the United States. They are not costless transfers and their 
deduction is essential for purposes of properly measuring USSub’s net 
income. Stated differently, deductions for these payments measure, 
 
 78. To hold otherwise would force USSub to borrow directly from the third-party 
lender and forgo the possibility that even if UKCo guaranteed USSub’s debts, UKCo 
could borrow at a lower cost than USSub because of the nuances of applicable debtor-
creditor law, UKCo’s greater size, and other factors. There is no apparent reason for the 
income tax law to force subsidiaries like USSub into direct borrowing from third parties 
when nontax market factors make it more efficient to have the borrowing done by a 
foreign parent. As stated by Professor Kleinbard: “Capital markets ordinarily prefer 
parent-level financing, because all of the group’s operations then support the loan, and 
because the agency costs associated with policing parent-subsidiary transfer pricing and 
transactions are irrelevant.” Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 12, at 163; see also Hey, supra 
note 77, at 342. If, however, UKCo maintained a corresponding deposit with its lender, 
UKCo’s real expense would be its net cost of borrowing. These and other avoidance 
schemes will be considered in formulating workable implementing rules, discussed infra 
Part III. 
 79. See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11, 63 (2012). 
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but do not transfer, USSub’s net income and, therefore, these 
deductions do not erode the U.S. income tax’s net income base. Thus, 
allowing them to be deductible does not amount to tolerating base 
erosion. To hold otherwise would lead to the conclusion that no 
deduction should be allowed for any business expenses paid to 
foreign unrelated parties in arm’s-length transactions. This would 
amount to an economically indefensible definition of the tax base and 
could have a deleterious effect on free trade.80 
But, to recapitulate, up to this point our analysis suggests that (i) 
interest charges paid by USSub to UKCo for use of the latter’s own 
capital, (ii) royalties that exceed the related development costs paid 
by USSub to UKCo for use of the latter’s self-developed intangibles, 
and (iii) services fees paid by USSub to UKCo that exceed UKCo’s 
actual cost of providing those services are all internal income 
distributions that should not generate U.S. income tax deductions for 
purposes of properly measuring USSub’s net income because they do 
not represent real costs.81 To reflect this point, we will use the terms 
“costless foreign related party expenses” and “costless foreign related 
party payments” throughout this Article as a short-hand reference to 
items that merely shift income within an MNE. In contrast, we use the 
terms “real expenses” and “real payments” in referring to outlays that 
are not costless foreign related party expenses or costless foreign 
related party payments.82 
We will discuss several further points below. First, should UKCo 
earn a normal return on its expenditures? Second, should UKCo earn 
more than a normal return on its expenditures or otherwise receive 
payments for costless foreign related party expenses? If economic 
rents are earned by the UKCo-USSub MNE, when should they 
appropriately be allocated away from USSub to UKCo (an inter-
nation income allocation question), and when is a deductible payment 
the appropriate legal mechanism for the transfer of income? 
 
 80. See ALI, SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY, supra note 76, at 80–83. 
 81. This is also the approach generally taken with respect to payments between a 
corporation’s branches and its headquarters. See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION: 
PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND OF THE 
FOREIGN INCOME OF UNITED STATES PERSONS 121 (1987) [hereinafter ALI, 
INTERNATIONAL TAX PROPOSALS]. 
 82. This is an expansion of an approach advocated by H. David Rosenbloom. See 
Rosenbloom, supra note 76, at 999–1000 (“[I]n the context of an ostensible debt owed by 
one such [related corporate] party to another, it strains credulity to say that ‘repayment 
absolutely and in all events’ is envisioned or provided for. Two pieces of paper owned 
ultimately by a single economic interest cannot do business together no matter what legal 
sophists say.”). 
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2.  Combined Reporting vs. Separate Accounting 
The foregoing conclusions assume that it is analytically correct to 
treat UKCo and USSub as a single economic enterprise. This seems 
indisputably so. The separate corporate existence of UKCo and 
USSub for income tax purposes is a legal fiction maintained for 
reasons of convenience83 that can be curtailed or eliminated when the 
costs of the fiction outweigh the benefits.84 Such would be the case if 
UKCo were permitted to remove income from the U.S. tax base 
merely by creating documents between itself and USSub, a controlled 
party that has no mind and will of its own.85 Moreover, UKCo and 
 
 83. See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 10–14 (2009) 
(explaining the administrative advantages of collecting income tax from corporations 
instead of from numerous shareholders); Charles I. Kingson, Can a Piece of Paper Earn 
Billions?, 71 TAX NOTES INT’L 243, 243 (2013) (stating that a “corporation is essentially a 
piece of legal paper”); Rosenbloom, supra note 76, at 992 (stating that “[b]ecause 
corporations are a convenient mechanism for the collection of tax, the U.S. system 
considers them income tax payers”); see also U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, INTEGRATION OF 
THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 29 
(1992) (stating that “tax is more likely to be collected if paid at the corporate level”). 
 84. See Rosenbloom, supra note 76, at 992 (“[T]here does not appear to be a 
fundamental inconsistency between collecting tax from the corporation and according it 
something less than full ‘person-hood’ equivalent to individuals.”); see also GEORGE K. 
YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: TAXATION 
OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES—REPORTERS’ STUDY 13–15 (1999) (proposing a 
mandatory system of conduit taxation that would include taxing the owners of closely held 
corporations directly on their shares of corporate income regardless of whether the 
income is actually distributed); ALVIN C. WARREN, JR., AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME 
TAXES—REPORTER’S STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION 1 (1993) 
(recommending that corporate income be subjected to a shareholder tax and that the 
corporate income tax be converted into a withholding mechanism for the shareholder tax). 
As stated by another commentator: 
[T]here is no general principle under international public law that countries have 
to simply accept the legal existence of a domestic or foreign corporate entity as a 
“shield” against any look-through approach from either side. Domestic legislation 
(including domestic legislation in the country of the parent company) decides 
which entities are “transparent” for tax purposes and which are not. Secondly, it 
cannot be denied that the shareholders of the parent company are the final 
recipients of profits earned by a subsidiary, even if these profits are not yet 
repatriated for the time being. Thus, it depends only on good policy reasons 
whether a look-through approach should be adopted, e.g. in the context of an 
integration system for individual and corporate income tax applied by the host 
country or in the context of anti-deferral measures (CFC legislation) established 
by the home country. 
Wolfgang Schön, International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World (Part I), 
WORLD TAX J. Sept. 2009, at 67, 92 [hereinafter Schön, Part I]. 
 85. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 709 (2011) 
[hereinafter Kleinbard, Stateless Income] (describing as “fantastic” the notion that “a 
wholly-owned subsidiary has a mind of its own with which to negotiate ‘arm’s-length’ 
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USSub are treated as a single enterprise with respect to financial 
reporting of profits and losses,86 and formulary apportionment 
systems with combined reporting would impose the same result.87 In 
addition, if USSub were the parent and UKCo were the subsidiary, 
the two corporations would be effectively treated as one for purposes 
of the indirect foreign tax credit.88 Finally, treating UKCo and USSub 
as a unit is consistent with the contemporary view that the corporate 
members of an MNE constitute an integrated enterprise in which the 
separate entity status of the members is a legal fiction with no 
economic substance.89 
 
contractual terms with its parent”). Of course, this depletion of the tax base is allowed in 
the domestic sphere where the related payee is a tax-exempt organization or a loss 
corporation. This, however, raises tax policy and tax theory issues outside the scope of this 
Article. 
 86. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND 
RELATING TO THE INTERACTION OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX RULES AND FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING RULES 31–32 (2012); Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Consolidating Foreign 
Affiliates, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 143, 154–56 (2011). 
 87. See SOL PICCIOTTO, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, TOWARDS UNITARY TAXATION 
OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 10 (2012), available at 
www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Towards_Unitary_Taxation_1-1.pdf; Rosanne 
Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Formula Apportionment: Is It Better Than the Current System 
and Are There Better Alternatives?, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 1145, 1145 (2010); Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah & Ilan Benshalom, Formulary Apportionment—Myths and Prospects, WORLD TAX 
J., Oct. 2011, at 371, 380; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. 
Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary 
Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 497, 508 (2009); Lorence L. Bravenec, Connecting the Dots 
in U.S. International Taxation, 27 TAX NOTES INT’L 845, 848–49 (2002); Cummings, supra 
note 86, at 148–49; Brian Lebowitz, Profit Sharing as a New World Order in International 
Taxation, 52 TAX NOTES INT’L 585, 589–90 (2008); Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be 
Saved? The Promises and Pitfalls of Adopting Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 
TAX L. REV. 169, 214 (2008); H. David Rosenbloom, Angels on a Pin: Arm’s Length in the 
World, 38 TAX NOTES INT’L 523, 523 (2005); Lee A. Sheppard, Is Transfer Pricing Worth 
Salvaging?, 136 TAX NOTES 467, 469 (2012). 
 88. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 23, at 367–71. 
 89. See PICCIOTTO, supra note 87, at 10; DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 197 (2014); Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 87, at 
501; Cummings, supra note 86, at 148–49; Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 85, at 
709 (rejecting the view that “a multinational enterprise that exists as a global platform to 
exploit a core set of intangible assets best is analogized to wholly independent actors 
taking on limited and straightforward roles in a vertical chain of production or a horizontal 
array of distribution of a product”); Rosenbloom, supra note 76, at 992 (“The economic 
justification for regarding a [related] group of 10 corporations as 10 separate persons is 
hardly compelling. There may well be nontax justifications for the creation of the group, 
but it is not foreordained that tax laws should respect the results.”). See generally J. 
COMM., INCOME SHIFTING AND TRANSFER PRICING, supra note 59, at 12–17 (describing 
intercompany transactions and their income tax consequences); Barbara Angus, Tom 
Neubig, Eric Solomon & Mark Weinberger, The U.S. International Tax System at a 
Crossroads, 127 TAX NOTES 45, 50–53 (2010) (discussing the rise of global companies and 
the increased importance of their interconnectivity). 
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Those who object to treating UKCo and USSub as a combined 
enterprise will point out that under the arm’s-length approach 
embedded in U.S. transfer pricing law, and in our tax law generally,90 
they are treated as separate entities whose contracts with each other 
generally are respected for purposes of allocating income and costs.91 
However, this aspect of U.S. international taxation exists primarily 
because its defenders insist that it is the best practical solution to 
international allocation problems and not because it has a sound 
normative basis.92 Indeed, the treatment of parents and subsidiaries as 
legally distinct entities for international income tax purposes, an 
approach known as separate accounting, is widely and severely 
criticized for being based on a legal formality (separate 
incorporation) that has no economic substance and that exposes the 
theoretical incompleteness of the arm’s-length transfer pricing 
regime.93 That regime does not provide a normative basis for treating 
UKCo and USSub as separate entities. Indeed, the case for treating 
them as a single MNE appears unassailable. 
3.  Affirming Nondeductibility 
This analysis seems to lead to the tentative conclusion that in 
Example 1, the payments from USSub to UKCo should not be 
deductible for U.S. income tax purposes to the extent they are 
costless foreign-related party expenses. Instead, it would appear that 
such expenses should be ignored and USSub’s deductions should be 
limited to real expenses. Speaking more broadly, it would seem that 
 
 90. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b) (2013). 
 91. See Moline Props. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436, 438–39 (1943); see also, e.g., ORG. FOR 
ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., GUIDANCE ON TRANSFER PRICING ASPECTS OF 
INTANGIBLES 40–42 (2014) [hereinafter OECD, GUIDANCE ON INTANGIBLES] (“Legal 
ownership and contractual relationships serve simply as reference points for identifying 
and analysing controlled transactions relating to the intangible and determining the 
appropriate remuneration to members of the controlled group with respect to the 
transactions.”). 
 92. See, e.g., OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 31, at 14 (disfavoring formulary 
apportionment as a replacement for the arm’s-length approach to transfer pricing because 
“it is . . . unclear that the behavioral changes companies might adopt in response to the use 
of a formula would lead to investment decisions that are more efficient and tax-neutral 
than under a separate entity approach”); id. at 19–20 (arguing that “[i]n many instances, 
the existing transfer pricing rules, based on the arm’s length principle, effectively and 
efficiently allocate the income of multinationals among taxing jurisdictions” and “rather 
than seeking to replace the current transfer pricing system, the best course is to directly 
address the flaws in the current system”). 
 93. See SHAVIRO, supra note 89, at 39–40; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Formulary 
Apportionment, supra note 16, at 18–20; Rosenbloom, supra note 76, at 995–96. See 
generally Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length, 30 TAX 
NOTES 625 (1986) (criticizing the arm’s-length standard). 
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in principle there should be no U.S. deductions for earnings stripping 
payments made to related foreign parties except to the extent the 
payments represent real expense. This tentative conclusion will be 
revisited in Part II.C., but, first, we will consider certain aspects of a 
rule of complete nondeductibility. 
4.  Conflict with Existing Domestic Law and Treaties 
 
 Notwithstanding the theoretical analysis above, existing U.S. 
federal income tax law does, in fact, treat even wholly owned 
subsidiaries and their parent corporations as separate taxpayers and 
generally regards payments between them as real.94 Thus, in Example 
1, § 162 would allow USSub to deduct its royalty and services fees 
payments and § 163 would allow USSub to deduct its interest 
payments, regardless of whether they represent real costs under the 
analysis of Example 1.95 Section 482 would limit all of those 
deductions to arm’s-length amounts, but the Example 1 facts state 
that this restriction would not affect USSub’s deductions because 
none of its payments exceed the arm’s-length standard.96 Thus, 
implementing the tentative conclusions regarding nondeductibility in 
the preceding paragraphs of this Part II.B. would require a change to 
current U.S. tax law. 
This discussion also raises important questions regarding the 
articles dealing with associated enterprises, interest, royalties, and 
nondiscrimination in the typical U.S. bilateral income tax treaty. 
Virtually all such treaties became effective after 1977.97 Thus, they are 
based on either the currently applicable U.S. Model Income Tax 
Treaty of 2006,98 or the earlier U.S. Models of 1996,99 1981,100 or 
1977.101 The salient provisions addressing associated enterprises, 
interest, royalties, and nondiscrimination are substantially identical in 
 
 94. See Moline Props., 319 U.S. at 438–39; Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 
525, 525 (1989), aff’d, 933 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 95. See, e.g., Estate of Paxton v. Comm’r, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 771, 771 (1982); Lausman 
v. Comm’r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1740, 1743 (1978). 
 96. See supra text accompanying notes 19–22. 
 97. See IRS, WITHHOLDING OF TAX ON NONRESIDENT ALIENS AND FOREIGN 
ENTITIES: PUBLICATION 515, at 59–60 tbl.3 (2013). 
 98. 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22. 
 99. See Daniel M. Berman, Covering the World: The Expanding U.S. Tax Treaty 
Network, 74 TAXES 1064, 1071–83 (1996). 
 100. 1981 U.S. MODEL INCOME AND CAPITAL TAX CONVENTION [hereinafter 1981 
U.S. MODEL]. 
 101. 1977 U.S. MODEL INCOME AND CAPITAL TAX CONVENTION [hereinafter 1977 
U.S. MODEL]. 
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all four of these U.S. Model versions.102 Consequently, the extent of 
any conflict between currently effective U.S. income tax treaties and 
rules disallowing deductions for payments of interest, royalties, and 
services fees to foreign-related parties can conveniently focus on the 
relevant language of the current U.S. Model Treaty.103 
Articles 11 and 12 of the current U.S. Model provide that treaty-
created withholding tax reductions with respect to interest and 
royalties received by nonresidents are inapplicable to the extent that 
the interest and royalties exceed arm’s-length amounts.104 These 
disqualifications, however, are irrelevant to the earnings stripping 
problem illustrated in Example 1 because the related party payments 
of interest and royalties in that example involve only arm’s-length 
amounts and Articles 11 and 12 do not apply to the fees for services in 
that example.105 Moreover, these Articles do not address the issue of 
whether deductions can be denied solely on the ground that expenses 
are costless. Thus, these provisions of the U.S. Model can be 
dismissed for purposes of this discussion. Nevertheless, this is not the 
end of treaty questions. 
Article 9 of the current U.S. Model allows treaty countries to 
make profit adjustments between related parties to correct transfer 
pricing abuses, including abuses involving interest, royalties, and 
services fees. It then adds that when one treaty party makes such an 
adjustment, “that other State shall make an appropriate adjustment 
to the amount of the tax charged therein on those profits.”106 Does 
this language carry the negative implication that if dealings between 
related parties do not involve a transfer pricing abuse, there can be no 
adjustments that would affect the tax liability of one of the related 
parties, not even a denial of deductions for costless expenses? 
Although nothing in the language of Article 9 can be fairly 
interpreted to create such an implication, the U.S. Treasury 
 
 102. Compare 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at arts. 9, 11, 12, 24, with Berman, 
supra note 99, at 1075–77, 1081, 1981 U.S. MODEL, supra note 100, at arts. 9, 11, 12, 24, 
and 1977 U.S. MODEL, supra note 101, at arts. 9, 11, 12, 24. 
 103. Indeed, in the treaties between the United States and Ireland and the United 
States and the United Kingdom, two of the most attractive destinations for earnings 
stripping payments, the salient provisions dealing with associated enterprises, interest, 
royalties, and nondiscrimination are substantially identical to the corresponding provisions 
in the current U.S. Model. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, 
U.S.-Ir., arts. 9, 11, 12, 25, July 28, 1997, 2141 U.N.T.S. 167; U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 
20, at arts. 9, 11, 12, 25. 
 104. See 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 11, para. 5, art. 12, para. 4. 
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 19–22. 
 106. 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 9, para. 2. 
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Department’s Technical Explanation of the U.S. Model states with 
respect to Article 9 that “[i]f the conditions of the transaction are 
consistent with those that would be made between independent 
persons, the income arising from that transaction should not be 
subject to adjustment under this Article.”107 In our view, this quoted 
statement does not impose a blanket prohibition against making 
adjustments to arm’s-length transactions. The italicized language 
indicates that the quotation applies only to adjustments based on the 
authority of Article 9. It says nothing about denying deductions for 
expenses on the ground that the expenses are costless. Thus, a 
statutory rule that prohibits the deduction of costless expense 
payments to foreign related parties would not, in our judgment, 
conflict with Article 9 of the typical U.S. income tax treaty. 
That conclusion brings us to the current U.S. Model’s Article 
24,108 which is the nondiscrimination provision contained in U.S. 
income tax treaties. The portions of Article 24 that are relevant to 
adoption of a U.S. rule denying deductions for costless expense 
payments by U.S. resident corporations to foreign related parties are 
Paragraphs 24.1, 24.4, and 24.5.109 Paragraph 24.1 provides that 
nationals of treaty partners (including corporations)110 shall not be 
subjected to more burdensome taxation than U.S. nationals “in the 
same circumstances.”111 Arguably, this has no impact on the 
disallowance of deductions for costless expense payments by U.S. 
corporations to foreign related parties because the disallowance 
increases the U.S. tax liability of the U.S. corporation, not the U.S. 
tax liability of the foreign related party. The counterargument would 
be that the foreign related party may bear some of the incidence of 
the increased tax on the U.S. corporation112 and that this should make 
 
 107. UNITED STATES MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE 
UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006, art. 9, para. 
1 [hereinafter U.S. EXPLANATION], available at www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Documents/TEMod006.pdf (emphasis added). 
 108. See 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 24. 
 109. In the U.S. context, Paragraph 24.2 applies only to permanent establishments 
(unincorporated branches) operated in the United States by nonresidents. See U.S. 
EXPLANATION, supra note 107, at art. 24, para. 2. Paragraph 24.3 applies only to 
nonresidents who are individuals. See U.S. EXPLANATION, supra note 107, at art. 24, para. 
3. 
 110. See 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 3, para. 1(j)(ii). 
 111. Id. at art. 24, para. 1. 
 112. Regarding the uncertain incidence of the corporate income tax, see U.S. 
TREASURY DEP’T, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE 
INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 2 (2007) (concluding that labor may bear a 
substantial burden from the corporate tax); JANE G. GRAVELLE & THOMAS L. 
HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34229, CORPORATE INCOME TAX REFORM: 
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Paragraph 24.1 applicable.113 There is no authority directly on point 
but the fact that Paragraph 24.4 deals explicitly with denial of 
deductions suggests that the more general language of Paragraph 24.1 
does not conflict with a domestic rule denying deductions for costless 
expenses paid to foreign related parties by U.S. corporations.114 
More importantly, if the United States were to adopt a rule 
prohibiting deductions for costless expenses paid by U.S. corporations 
to related foreign parties, but not to related domestic parties, 
Paragraph 24.1 states that such a rule would not be a violation thereof 
unless the foreign and domestic payees were “in the same 
circumstances.”115 Regarding this point, the U.S. Model’s Technical 
Explanation states that “if one person is taxable in a Contracting 
State on worldwide income and the other is not, . . . distinctions in 
treatment would be justified under paragraph [24.]1.”116 Since U.S. 
resident payees of costless expenses are taxable by the United States 
on their worldwide incomes but foreign payees of such expenses are 
usually taxable by the United States only on U.S.-source income, it 
would seem that a U.S. rule prohibiting deductions for costless 
expense payments by U.S. corporations to foreign related parties but 
not to U.S. related parties would not conflict with Paragraph 24.1 of 
the standard U.S. bilateral income tax treaty.117 This conclusion is 
 
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 15–29 (Cong. Res. Serv. 2011) (concluding that most of the 
corporate tax’s burden falls on capital). 
 113. See 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 24, para. 1. 
 114. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME 
AND CAPITAL, COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE 24, PARAGRAPH 1 [hereinafter OECD, 
COMMENTARY] (“Article [24] should not be unduly extended to cover so-called ‘indirect’ 
discrimination.”); Mary C. Bennett, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture—Nondiscrimination 
in International Tax Law: A Concept in Search of a Principle, 59 TAX L. REV. 439, 468 
(2006) (stating that in the few relevant cases, the “courts showed no willingness to look 
behind the terms of the relevant law to determine whether its overwhelming practical 
effect would be to disfavor members of the protected class”). 
 115. 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 24, para. 1. 
 116. U.S. EXPLANATION, supra note 107, at art. 24. 
 117. A U.S. rule prohibiting deductions of costless expense payments to foreign related 
parties would be mainly applicable to payments by U.S. subsidiary corporations to 
affiliated foreign corporations—the scenario illustrated in Example 1. With respect to that 
situation, the following comment by a prominent international income tax law practitioner 
is relevant: 
In the case of corporations, Article 24(1) . . . has essentially no impact for U.S. 
income tax purposes, because the dividing line between those corporations subject 
to U.S. tax on their worldwide income and those not so subject is . . . whether the 
corporation is incorporated under U.S. laws. Thus, a corporation that is not a U.S. 
“national” is, virtually by definition, not “in the same circumstances” as a 
corporation that is a U.S. national. 
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supported by the fact that unless a related domestic payee is a tax-
exempt entity, deductible payments to domestic related payees 
remain in the U.S. tax base while deductible payments to foreign 
related payees that are not controlled foreign corporations are 
excluded from the U.S. tax base.118 
There is, however, more to discuss regarding Article 24. 
Paragraph 24.5 states: 
Enterprises of a Contracting State, the capital of which is 
wholly or partly owned or controlled directly or indirectly, by 
one or more residents of the other Contracting State, shall not 
be subjected in the first-mentioned State to any taxation or any 
requirement connected therewith that is more burdensome 
than the taxation and connected requirements to which other 
similar enterprises of the first-mentioned State are or may be 
subjected.119 
For purposes of this provision, the term “enterprises” has been 
interpreted to include business activity carried on by a corporation.120 
Thus, in Example 1, USSub is an enterprise of the United States 
within the meaning of Paragraph 24.5. However, Paragraph 24.5 only 
applies to domestic rules that discriminate on the basis of foreign 
ownership.121 A U.S. provision that prohibits deductions for costless 
expense payments made to foreign related parties, but not to U.S. 
resident related parties, will be acceptable under Paragraph 24.5 so 
long as it makes no distinction between U.S. payors that are U.S.-
owned and U.S. payors that are foreign-owned.122 This is precisely the 
 
Bennett, supra note 114, at 446; see also OECD, COMMENTARY, supra note 114, at para. 
17 (stating that “two companies that are not residents of the same state for purposes of the 
Convention . . . are usually not in the same circumstances for purposes of paragraph 
[24].1”); Philip F. Postlewaite & David S. Makarski, The A.L.I. Tax Treaty Study—A 
Critique and a Modest Proposal, 52 TAX LAW. 731, 794 (1999) (“Non-residents are seldom 
in the same circumstances as that of a resident because they are generally not subject to 
tax on their worldwide income.”). 
 118. See infra note 146. 
 119. 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 24, para. 4. 
 120. In UnionBanCal Corp. v. Comm’r, 113 T. C. 309, 325–26 (1999), aff’d, 305 F.3d 
976 (9th Cir. 2002), the courts treated the term “enterprises” in Paragraph 24(5) of the 
United States-United Kingdom income tax treaty, which was virtually identical to 
Paragraph 24.5 of the current U.S. Model, as including business corporations. 
 121. See Square D Co. & Subs. v. Comm’r, 438 F.3d 739, 748 (7th Cir. 2006), aff’g 118 
T.C. 299 (2002) (stating that Paragraph 24.5 “hinges on the nationality of the related party 
to whom the payment goes and does not fluctuate based on nationality of the ultimate 
owner [of the payor]”). 
 122. See UnionBanCal Corp. v. Comm’r, 305 F.3d 976, 987 (2002) (stating that 
“discrimination against foreign-owned subsidiaries is all that the nondiscrimination clause 
at issue protected it against”). 
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type of rule that is suggested by the analysis in this Part II.B., and, 
therefore, there would be no conflict with Paragraph 24.5 of the 
current U.S. Model. 
The preceding analysis also leads to a solution for the problem 
posed by Paragraph 24.4. This paragraph provides that arm’s-length 
amounts of “interest, royalties, and other disbursements paid by a 
resident of a Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting 
State shall, for the purpose of determining the taxable profits of the 
first-mentioned resident, be deductible under the same conditions as 
if they had been paid to a resident of the first-mentioned State.”123 
Paragraph 24.4 does not provide an exception to this requirement for 
cases where foreign and domestic payees are in different 
circumstances.124 Therefore, a U.S. rule prohibiting deductions for 
 
  In Square D Co. & Subs., 438 F.3d 739, a U.S. resident subsidiary corporation 
claimed 1991 and 1992 deductions under the accrual method of accounting for interest 
then owed to its French parent corporation but not paid until 1995 and 1996. 438 F.3d at 
740. Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3 generally provides that interest owed to a foreign related 
party cannot be deducted until actually paid. Relying on this regulation, the IRS 
disallowed the U.S. subsidiary’s 1991 and 1992 deductions and asserted that they had to be 
deferred until actual payment was made in 1995 and 1996. Id. The U.S. subsidiary 
contended that the regulation violated the portion of the United States-France income tax 
treaty that was substantially identical to Paragraph 24.5 of the current 2006 U.S. Model. 
Id. at 743. The U.S. subsidiary’s argument was that because the deductions would have 
been allowed in 1991 and 1992 if the parent corporation had been a U.S. resident, denial 
of the deductions until 1995 and 1996 on account of the parent corporation being a French 
resident amounted to more burdensome taxation on a French corporation’s U.S. 
subsidiary in violation of the treaty. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court and 
upheld the validity of the regulation, even though it discriminated, because it did not 
create the type of discrimination that was prohibited by Paragraph 24.5 of the U.S. Model. 
Id. at 748. The pertinent portion of the Seventh Circuit opinion states that 
[Prohibited] discrimination is absent here. The regulation requires that all interest 
payments to a foreign related party must use the cash method of accounting 
without regard to the nationality of the owner [of the payor]. The regulation does 
not impose the cash method simply because of foreign ownership [of the payor], 
which would be prohibited, but rather for payments to a foreign related party. 
Even if a corporation were owned by a United States parent, it still appears all 
interest payments to one of these foreign related parties would lead to the use of 
the cash method. The requirement, therefore, hinges on the nationality of the 
related party to whom the payment goes and does not fluctuate based on 
nationality of the ultimate owner [of the payor]. It is merely fortuitous that, in this 
case, the foreign related party to which the payment was made also happened to be 
the owner. The regulation does not discriminate based on foreign ownership [of 
the payor], and thus, does not violate the nondiscrimination clause. 
Id. at 748 (emphasis added); see also Square D Co. & Subs., 118 T.C. at 313–15 (adopting 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision). 
 123. 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 24, para. 4.  
 124. The Technical Explanation of the U.S, Model Treaty states, in the introductory 
paragraphs of the explanation of Article 24, that there is an exception to Paragraph 24.4 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 673 (2015) 
2015] CROSS-BORDER EARNINGS STRIPPING 707 
arm’s-length amounts of costless expense payments made to foreign 
related parties, but not to U.S. resident related parties, would appear 
to conflict with Paragraph 24.4.125 When Congress enacted § 163(j), 
which limits a U.S. corporation’s current deductions for interest 
payments made to related parties but nevertheless allows substantial 
amounts of such interest to be deducted within the limitation,126 
Congress argued that § 163(j) did not conflict with U.S. treaty 
obligations.127 Two of its arguments, evidently made with Paragraph 
24.4 in mind, were that § 163(j) is both a rule for identifying non-
arm’s-length interest amounts and a thin capitalization rule for 
detecting dividends disguised as interest payments,128 both types of 
rules being free from conflict with Paragraph 24.4.129 Even if these 
arguments are valid,130 however, they surely cannot be stretched far 
enough to legitimate a rule that would deny deductions for arm’s-
length interest payments by adequately capitalized U.S. corporations 
to foreign related parties but not to U.S. resident related parties. 
Moreover, these arguments have no application to a rule that limits 
deductions for other kinds of payments to foreign related parties but 
not to the U.S. resident related parties. 
Fortunately, these difficulties can be overcome by adopting a 
U.S. rule that prohibits deductions for payments of costless expenses 
to all related parties, both domestic and foreign. Under this approach, 
payments to residents of treaty countries will be deductible “under 
the same conditions as if they had been paid to a resident” of the 
treaty partner country.131 This approach involves a broader deduction 
prohibition than the rule that solved the challenge posed by 
Paragraph 24.5. That rule was limited to costless payments made to 
foreign related parties—an approach that does not work under 
Paragraph 24.4. 
 
where foreign and domestic payees are in dissimilar situations. However, that is a printing 
error and the statement clearly is intended to refer to Paragraph 24.5. See U.S. 
EXPLANATION, supra note 107, at art. 24. 
 125. See U.S. EXPLANATION, supra note 107, at art. 24, para. 4. 
 126. For an explanation of the loose constraint imposed by Section 163(j), see infra 
Part III.B. 
 127. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 569 (1989). 
 128. See id.; AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL 
ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II—PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES 
INCOME TAX TREATIES 281 (1992) [hereinafter ALI, TREATY PROPOSALS]. 
 129. Paragraph 24.4 does not apply to nondeductible dividends and is also inapplicable 
to other payments to the extent that they are non-arm’s-length. 
 130. For prominent criticism of these arguments, see ALI, TREATY PROPOSALS, supra 
note 128, at 281. 
 131. 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 24, para. 4. 
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In summary, the potential for conflict between the U.S. bilateral 
treaty network and a U.S. rule that prohibits deductions for costless 
expense payments made to related foreign parties is most acute with 
respect to Paragraph 24.4 of the current U.S. Model. The conflict, 
however, can be eliminated with a rule that applies regardless of 
whether the related party is U.S. or foreign. 
5.  Taxpayer and IRS Gains 
A general rule of nondeductibility would have two desirable 
collateral effects. First, the pressure on the debt/equity distinction 
would be reduced because interest payments to related foreign 
parents that did not represent real expenses would be treated the 
same as dividends; they would be nondeductible. Thus, the taxpayer 
planning costs and the IRS enforcement resources devoted to the 
debt/equity distinction would be reduced, and the distortive incentive 
to over-leverage U.S. subsidiaries would also be reduced. 
Second, if all foreign related party payments by U.S. 
corporations would be nondeductible, the importance of transfer 
pricing enforcement with respect to outbound interest, royalty, and 
services fees payments would be greatly lessened.132 Consequently, 
the related taxpayer compliance and planning costs would be 
reduced, and the IRS administrative resources presently used to 
police this area of transfer pricing could be devoted to other 
purposes. In a case where the MNE earns economic rents, however, 
this approach would leave unresolved the issue of whether the rents 
properly reside in the company where the income attributable to 
rents is located under the MNE’s accounting methodology. We will 
take up this question in the next Part.  
C. The Investment Location Primacy Principle 
In spite of the strong case for treating all costless foreign related 
party payments as nondeductible, there are countervailing 
considerations as illustrated by Example 4. 
1.  Intangibles 
Example 4: As in Example 1, USSub is the wholly owned U.S. 
marketing subsidiary of UKCo, a U.K. corporation that has 
incurred considerable costs in the United Kingdom to develop a 
 
 132. See IMF, SPILLOVERS, supra note 49, at 33–34 (suggesting limitations on 
deductions for intra-MNE interest payments as a partial alternative to transfer pricing 
enforcement based on the arm’s-length principle). 
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marketing intangible that is licensed to USSub for use in its 
U.S. marketing activities. To aid in clear analysis, we make the 
simplifying assumption that 100% of USSub’s royalty payments 
to UKCo equals both a source country market return on 
UKCo’s cost investment in the intangible as well as an arm’s-
length amount. Because the intangible was developed in the 
United Kingdom, there is a plausible argument for allowing 
that country an exclusive right to tax the market return on the 
development cost (which would include recovery of that 
cost).133 That market return happens to be 100% of USSub’s 
royalty payments to UKCo under the facts of this example. We 
will refer to this as the Investment Location Primacy Principle. 
It would allow USSub to fully deduct the royalty payments so 
as to remove them from the U.S. tax base. 
Professor Lawrence Lokken has, however, suggested a different 
conclusion.134 In 1981, he published an article in which he argued that 
for purposes of determining the source of a royalty payment, both the 
country where the related intangible was created (the United 
Kingdom in Example 4) and the country where the intangible is used 
(the United States in Example 4), have legitimate source claims.135 
Nevertheless, since he viewed split sourcing as impractical,136 he 
concluded that the royalty payment should be sourced entirely to the 
country of use because that country’s legal protections make 
exploitation of the related intangible possible and, therefore, give that 
country the stronger source claim.137 
Although Professor Lokken’s analysis was developed for 
purposes of applying the U.S. rules for taxing U.S.-source income of 
nonresident aliens and foreign corporations,138 it is relevant by 
analogy to the inter-nation allocation of the income represented by 
royalty payments received by a foreign parent corporation from a 
 
 133. See AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 53, 
at 44–45; Lawrence Lokken, The Sources of Income from International Uses and 
Dispositions of Intellectual Property, 36 TAX L. REV. 233, 241–42 (1981); Shay, Fleming & 
Peroni, What’s Source Got to Do with It?, supra note 29, at 143. 
 134. See Lokken, supra note 133, at 241–43. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. at 242 (“[A] typical royalty cannot feasibly be split between the place of the 
licensee’s use of the licensed property and the place of the activities by which the licensor 
created the property.”); see also Wolfgang Schön, International Tax Coordination for a 
Second-Best World (Part II), WORLD TAX J., Feb. 2010, at 65, 91 [hereinafter Schön, Part 
II]. 
 137. See Lokken, supra note 133, at 242–43 (“Overall, the country in which a licensee 
uses intellectual property therefore has the strongest claim of origin.”). 
 138. See I.R.C. §§ 864, 871, 881, 882 (2012). 
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U.S. subsidiary. If his analysis were applied to Example 4,139 it would 
reach the opposite of our conclusion in that it would give the United 
States the primary taxing claim with respect to the income 
represented by USSub’s royalty payments. That would mean that the 
payments would be nondeductible by USSub. The royalty payments 
would be characterized for U.S. tax purposes as distributions with 
respect to UKCo’s USSub stock, and the United Kingdom would 
have the obligation to relieve double taxation.140 
We respectfully disagree with this approach. At this point, our 
discussion is purely theoretical, and if USSub pays a royalty to UKCo 
in Example 4 that is limited to a normal market return on UKCo’s 
U.K. creation cost, it seems to us that, in theory, this royalty 
represents a return on the U.K. development work that should be 
allocated exclusively to the U.K. tax base141 to the extent that it does 
 
 139. Professor Lokken did not, however, argue for this extension of his analysis. See 
Lokken, supra note 133, at 241–43. 
 140. Professor Lokken addressed the operation of the U.S. rules for taxing the U.S.-
source income of nonresident aliens and foreign corporations. He did not expressly deal 
with the inter-nation allocation of corporate profits or the consequences of denying 
deductions when computing corporate net income (i.e., profits). However, his analysis can 
be fairly understood as suggesting the outcome stated in the text. See Lokken, supra note 
133, at 241–43. 
 141. See Schön, Part II, supra note 136, at 92–93. 
  Economists generally hold that the development of many intangible property 
items (excluding logos, brand names, and the like) creates uncontrollable spillover effects 
that can be enjoyed without cost by free riders. As a result, developers are said to be 
unable to capture the full benefit of their costs and so have a tendency to underinvest in 
creating this type of property. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (2007). A frequent prescription for solving this 
problem is a tax incentive for research and development. See, e.g., id.; Robert D. 
Atkinson, The Case for the Research Tax Credit, 142 TAX NOTES 1226, 1226–27 (2014); 
Martin A. Sullivan, Time to Scrap the Research Credit, 126 TAX NOTES 891, 891 (2010). In 
this Article, we take no position on this matter. We do note, however, that if a tax 
incentive is proper, the country where development occurs seems to be the appropriate 
governmental authority to provide the incentive. This point is not specifically applicable to 
the marketing intangible that is featured in Example 4 because that type of intangible is 
unlikely to create uncontrollable spillover benefits. 
  Additionally, assigning USSub’s royalty payments to the U.K.’s taxing jurisdiction 
as a return on UKCo’s development costs is consistent with the view that intangible 
income should be allocated to the countries where value creation occurs. See OECD, 
ACTION PLAN, supra note 31, at 18, 20. 
  Professor Adam Rosenzweig has recommended the adoption of rules that would 
allocate intangible income to lesser developed countries to assist them in providing public 
goods to their residents. See Adam H. Rosenzweig, Building a Framework for a Post-
BEPS World, 74 TAX NOTES INT’L 1077, 1080–81 (2014). This raises broader questions 
about proposals for delivering foreign aid through the tax system. As explained in our 
earlier work, if the tax system is to be used to deliver economic assistance to needy 
countries, the best approach is to employ bilaterally negotiated arrangements rather than 
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not exceed an arm’s-length amount.142 In contrast, income resulting 
from using UKCo’s intangible to exploit the U.S. market is 
appropriately allocated to, and should be taxed by, the United States. 
In fact, that income is included in the profits of USSub that are 
taxable by the United States after deductions are allowed for USSub’s 
royalty payments to UKCo.143 Thus, in our view, the royalty should be 
deductible by USSub, up to the lesser of a normal market return on 
UKCo’s creation cost or an arm’s-length amount, and the deductible 
amount should be taxed exclusively by the United Kingdom.144 
However, if the United States applies the No Deduction for 
Costless Payments Principle developed in Part II.B., USSub will not 
be allowed to deduct the part of its royalty payments to UKCo in 
Example 4 that exceeds a recovery of UKCo’s development cost. This 
is so because the excess payments are simply costless transfers within 
an MNE.145 Under that approach, the nondeductible portion of the 
 
generally applicable statutory rules. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness, supra note 7, at 
344–49. 
 142. In general, a normal market return on UKCo’s creation cost would be an arm’s-
length royalty. If, however, market dynamics cause a difference to occur, we believe that a 
nuanced application of the arm’s-length benchmark such as that under development by 
the OECD should be the standard for allocating income between related parties. See 
OECD, GUIDANCE ON INTANGIBLES, supra note 91, at 40–42. 
 143. Professor Schön has demonstrated that in a complex intangible licensing situation, 
up to four different countries may have plausible taxing claims with respect to income 
generated by the intangible in question. See Schön, Part II, supra note 136, at 92. In such a 
case, a more nuanced approach to international income allocation will be required than 
the one examined in this Article. However, we believe that the simple binary allocation 
issue that we have discussed is adequate to demonstrate that the Investment Location 
Primacy Principle requires careful analysis and that the country where the intangible is put 
to use can satisfy its taxing claim even while allowing a deduction for the related royalty 
payment. 
 144. Not only do deductions serve to define the net income tax base, they also shift 
income when coupled with a linked income inclusion that is imposed on another taxpayer. 
A prominent example in U.S. federal income tax law is § 215, which defines an alimony 
payor’s tax base by allowing a deduction for alimony payments, but which also shifts 
income from the alimony payor to the alimony payee because of the linked income 
inclusion imposed on the payee by § 71. Similarly, the allowance of U.S. deductions for 
USSub’s royalty payments shifts income to the U.K. tax base by leaving the United 
Kingdom with the exclusive right to tax those payments. 
  If UKCo had acquired the intangible by license or purchase, then the royalty 
would be a return on UKCo’s investment in the intangible. In this scenario, however, 
UKCo would not have engaged in any U.K. development activity, and USSub’s royalty 
payments to UKCo would be entirely the result of exploiting the U.S. market. Thus, the 
Investment Location Primacy Principle would not require that an income shifting 
deduction be allowed for the royalty payments. 
 145. See supra text accompanying notes 78–82. We acknowledge the sometimes 
difficult practical issues of identifying which costs relate to development of an intangible 
and how to allocate the costs of unsuccessful research, but these issues are well known and 
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royalty payments will effectively be included in the U.S. tax base (the 
opposite of our conclusion just stated above) instead of being 
allocated exclusively to the U.K. tax base. In contrast, if USSub were 
allowed to fully deduct its royalty payments to UKCo, the deduction 
would eliminate the payments from the U.S. tax base, and they would 
be exclusively in the U.K. tax base.146 This is the correct result if one 
accepts the argument that the United Kingdom has the primary 
taxing right on all returns to the cost of developing the intangible in 
the United Kingdom. Obviously, in Example 4, there is a conflict 
between the No Deduction for Costless Payments Principle outlined 
in Part II.B. and the Investment Location Primacy Principle. We will 
address that conflict below.147 
Before doing so, however, we must point out that our argument 
for assigning royalties to the development country is subject to 
qualifications. First, our argument that the Investment Location 
Primacy Principle supports a taxing right on the part of the 
development country would not justify an income allocation to the 
development country greater than the lesser of a normal return on the 
development cost or an arm’s-length amount.148 Thus, in Example 4, 
the Investment Location Primacy Principle would allow USSub to 
deduct only royalty payments that do not exceed that benchmark. 
Payments in excess of that ceiling are costless intra-MNE 
transfers and, therefore, should be nondeductible by USSub for U.S. 
income tax purposes. Under this approach, supranormal returns, i.e., 
economic rents, would be taxable by the United States. It is not clear, 
however, that this is the correct approach. In the context of a 
particular intangible, economic rent exists because an exuberant 
consumer preference allows the supplier to charge a price in excess of 
what is justified by any possible objective superiority of the related 
good or service. The necessary consumer reaction to the intangible is 
a consequence of both development work (suggesting allocation to 
 
regularly addressed in a variety of contexts. Moreover, our proposal to allow a normal 
return on costs subsumes these issues. See infra text accompanying notes 148 and 159. 
 146. To illustrate the after-tax effects of these two scenarios, assume that USSub pays a 
$100 royalty payment to UKCo. Also assume that USSub’s marginal U.S. income tax rate 
is 35%. If the United States does not allow a deduction for the royalty payment, the 
payment will come from funds bearing a 35% U.S. tax. Thus, the after-tax cost to USSub 
of the $100 payment would be $154 ($154 × [1-.35] = $100). In contrast, if the United 
States does allow a deduction for USSub’s royalty payment to UKCo, the deduction will 
shelter the payment from U.S. tax so that only $100 of cash would be required to make the 
royalty payment. 
 147. See infra text accompanying notes 190–98. 
 148. See supra notes 141–42. 
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the development country) and consumer mindset (suggesting 
allocation to the market country). Thus, allocating rent from 
intangibles between development and market countries is an issue for 
which there is no easy answer. Supranormal returns or rents are the 
key point of intersection of earnings stripping and transfer pricing. 
Our approach to earnings stripping would isolate this critical issue 
and force taxpayers and tax authorities to identify returns that exceed 
normal levels and develop explicit methods for dividing these returns 
for taxation purposes. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to reach final conclusions on 
the important and difficult issue of how to allocate economic rents, 
i.e., residual profits, of an MNE; however, this is not a new problem. 
We have explained in other work why we disfavor formulary 
apportionment as a method for allocating the entire taxable income 
from a business.149 There, we favored use of a residual profit split 
method and also accepted that there is room for use of factors as a 
basis on which to allocate income in particular circumstances.150 The 
allocation of economic rents is such a circumstance. 
The allocation of residual profit also underlies the methodology 
of the OECD’s authorized approach under Article 7 of the OECD 
Model Convention.151 That method emphasizes taking into account 
the functions performed by, and the assets and risks borne in, each 
country.152 Consistent with our analysis of costless payments within an 
MNE, we are highly skeptical of risk shifting within an MNE. Thus, 
we would focus on real functions performed by actual employees 
using real assets. Before formulating our concrete conclusion 
regarding the difficult problem of allocating rents, however, we look 
forward to learning the outcome of the rethinking of these issues in 
connection with the OECD BEPS project.153 We hope that this 
Article will be helpful to that project. 
Our analysis calls for the application of transfer pricing rules to 
determine the portion of royalty payments that does not exceed the 
normal return/arm’s-length ceiling and the excess portion. Although 
the transfer pricing law on this point is not always precise, our 
 
 149. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Formulary Apportionment, supra note 16, at 56–57. 
 150. See id. at 158. 
 151. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND 
CAPITAL, art. 7 (2010) [hereinafter OECD, MODEL CONVENTION]. 
 152. See id. at art. 7, para. 2. 
 153. See OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 31, at 19–20; OECD, GUIDANCE ON 
INTANGIBLES, supra note 91, at 9–12 (proposing revisions to OECD transfer pricing 
guidelines on intangibles); Brauner, supra note 31, at 86–103. 
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restriction of an allowable royalty deduction to a normal return on an 
expenditure greatly simplifies this aspect of the calculation. 
Moreover, we have explained in other work how these methods can 
be made less vulnerable to taxpayer gaming by allowing the IRS to 
make retrospective adjustments.154 
Finally, it should be noted that the most extensive erosion of the 
U.S. tax base by means of deductible royalty payments is not 
accomplished by foreign owners of U.S. subsidiaries who use royalty 
expense deductions to shift income out of the United States.155 
Instead, the most extensive degradation of the U.S. tax base results 
from U.S. MNEs moving their intangibles to tax-haven corporations 
in countries where royalties are subject to little or no foreign tax, 
remain unrepatriated for long periods of time, and then can be 
sheltered from U.S. taxation by cross-crediting.156 In other words, it is 
regrettable that transfer pricing law appears to be the principal tool 
for limiting earnings stripping through deductible royalties, but that is 
the lesser portion of the problem of the U.S. tax base being eroded by 
transfers of intangibles returns. In addition, as we have often 
observed, a significant part of the overall problem would be 
substantially curtailed by U.S. adoption of real worldwide taxation.157 
There is a second qualification to the argument that the 
Investment Location Primacy Principle gives the country where an 
intangible was developed an exclusive right to tax the lesser of a 
normal market return on the development costs or an arm’s-length 
royalty. It is that, as a practical matter, this principle can be applied 
only if the ultimate licensor of the intangible is subject to the taxing 
jurisdiction of the development country, as is the case in Example 4.158 
Although the foregoing analysis has identified limitations to the 
Investment Location Primacy Principle, it has left a substantial core 
of that principle intact with respect to intangibles. That is, the country 
where an intangible is developed should have a primary right to tax 
 
 154. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Formulary Apportionment, supra note 16, at 55. 
 155. See generally Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 12 (explaining how U.S. MNEs move 
royalty income to low-tax foreign countries); Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 85 
(same). 
 156. See generally Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 12, at 124–29 (explaining how U.S. 
MNEs use cross-crediting to shelter royalties from U.S. taxation); Kleinbard, Stateless 
Income, supra note 85, at 727–50 (same). 
 157. See, e.g., Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives, supra note 3, at 1081; Peroni, 
Fleming, & Shay, Getting Serious, supra note 3, at 468–70, 497–501, 507–16. 
 158. The development country generally cannot tax income paid from a second 
country to a recipient that is located in a third country and that is not otherwise subject to 
the development country’s taxing jurisdiction. 
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foreign-source intangibles royalties received by a licensor that is 
subject to its taxing jurisdiction but only to the extent that the 
royalties do not exceed the lesser of a normal market return on the 
licensor’s development costs (which includes recovery of those costs) 
or an arm’s-length amount.159 Thus, in Example 4, USSub should get a 
U.S. deduction for its royalty payments that are not greater than that 
benchmark. The deduction will shift the deducted amount out of the 
U.S. tax base and make it exclusively subject to taxation by the 
United Kingdom. In addition, royalties paid by USSub that effectively 
reimburse UKCo for its costs of acquiring the use of unrelated party 
intangibles that it has sublicensed to USSub are real costs to USSub 
rather than costless intra-MNE transfers. Therefore, USSub should 
be allowed to deduct such payments. 
2.  Relevance of a Foreign Tax 
What if the USSub royalty payments that we have just argued 
should be deductible for U.S. tax purposes are not taxed by the 
United Kingdom, are taxed by the United Kingdom at a rate that is 
much lower than the U.S. rate, or are paid through the United 
Kingdom as a conduit to an affiliate in a low-tax country? To the 
extent that USSub’s deductions are allowed in order to either 
properly allocate income to the U.K.’s taxing jurisdiction or to 
recognize real costs borne by UKCo for the benefit of USSub, it may 
be argued that U.S. tax deductions should be allowed regardless of 
the extent to which a U.K. tax is imposed on UKCo’s receipt of the 
royalties. 
We have argued in earlier work that income should not be 
treated as foreign-source for purposes of applying a territorial 
system160 unless the income bears a substantial foreign tax.161 That is 
because the purpose of the exemption for foreign-source income 
under a territorial system is to mitigate double taxation that would 
otherwise chill international trade and investment.162 However, 
application of the U.S. income tax to foreign-source income cannot 
cause double taxation unless that income bears a significant foreign 
tax.163 For that reason, we have argued that an exemption for foreign 
income should not be available if the United States were to adopt a 
 
 159. See supra text accompanying notes 147–58. 
 160. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing, supra note 9, at 413–15. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. at 401–03. 
 163. See id. at 413–15. 
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territorial system unless the relevant foreign-source income is subject 
to a meaningful foreign tax.164 
Double taxation is not, however, the issue regarding the 
deductible royalties paid by USSub to UKCo in Example 4. There the 
objective is to (i) allocate income representing a normal return to the 
appropriate country or (ii) to take account of real costs borne by 
USSub that must be recognized in order to properly measure 
USSub’s U.S.-source net income. In that context, U.S. deductions for 
USSub’s royalty payments should be allowed to the extent that 
UKCo has borne real third-party costs for the benefit of USSub, 
regardless of the U.K.’s tax treatment of those payments. Allocating 
“normal return” income, however, is an issue of inter-nation revenue 
allocation and not measurement of income.165 Thus, it is necessary to 
determine whether source rules and transfer pricing rules are 
sufficiently robust that they should be relied upon to allocate even 
normal returns between countries in the absence of a meaningful 
foreign tax on the income.166 
As observed above, attributing income to a geographic source 
according to the legal category of income is a “weak margin.”167 That 
is, it is not a strong basis on which to determine important tax 
consequences because source of income does not rest on a strong 
normative basis and, in a range of cases, is susceptible to 
manipulation.168 The Investment Location Primacy Principle can be 
relied upon to identify which entity should earn income with respect 
to a third-party cost, but, if there is no such third-party cost, the 
“investment location” is a function of non-arm’s-length arrangements 
among related parties and their dependent agents.169 It is, thus, 
possible to inappropriately manipulate the investment location. A 
subject-to-tax test adds a level of adversity with which to test the 
reality of the claimed investment location. Without the friction of a 
meaningful foreign tax, normal returns may be artificially shifted and 
 
 164. See id. 
 165. See supra text accompanying notes 133–44. 
 166. For purposes of this discussion, we are continuing to assume that the payments are 
arm’s length. If that assumption is relaxed, the case for requiring a meaningful foreign tax 
as a condition to allowing the deduction becomes stronger. 
 167. See supra text accompanying notes 27–31. 
 168. See Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 85, at 750–52; Shay, Fleming & Peroni, 
What’s Source Got to Do with It?, supra note 29, at 137–38. 
 169. In other words, related corporations can agree among themselves to have 
intangibles inappropriately considered to be developed in a low-tax country because the 
work done and the risks assumed in the low-tax country are overstated. 
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the source country denied revenue that is taxed nowhere or, if at all, 
at a low rate. 
It is internationally recognized that the source country is entitled 
to tax income arising within its borders and owned by foreign 
investors.170 As a matter of inter-nation equity, this principle permits 
the source country to derive its share of revenue from the foreign-
owned capital in its country.171 Moreover, because of the “weak 
margin” concerns, the source country should be allowed to assert its 
claim to revenue by denying deductions if the investment location 
country does not tax the income.172 In other words, we would allow 
inter-nation revenue allocation concerns to take precedence over the 
Investment Location Primary Principle in circumstances where the 
normal return would not be subject to a meaningful foreign tax. We 
next consider how to apply this approach in the context of hybrid 
mismatches and taxation under another country’s controlled foreign 
company rules. 
Hybrid mismatches present a situation of current concern where 
the existence, or not, of a foreign tax liability is relevant. From the 
U.S. standpoint, a hybrid mismatch is presented when (1) a payment 
from a U.S. taxpayer to a foreign resident bears no U.S. tax because 
the payment is deductible for U.S. purposes and (2) the payment also 
escapes foreign tax because it is excludable from the foreign payee’s 
income under the applicable foreign tax regime.173 The result of this 
asymmetry is income that is taxed nowhere, also referred to as 
“double non-taxed income,” “homeless income,” and “stateless 
income.”174 
Hybrid mismatches that are relevant to U.S. earnings stripping 
concerns can arise when a U.S. corporation issues a financial 
instrument that is treated by the U.S. tax system as debt producing 
deductible interest payments but that is characterized by the foreign 
holder’s residence country as an equity investment yielding exempt 
 
 170. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing, supra note 9, at 401. 
 171. See Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in International 
Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1335, 1341–42 (2001). 
 172. In this situation, the lack of taxation by the investment location country 
substantially increases the likelihood that the investment location is artificial and arranged 
for tax-avoidance reasons. 
 173. See Michael L. Schler, OECD vs. D/NI: Ending Mismatches on Hybrid 
Instruments, Part I, 75 TAX NOTES INT’L 485, 488–89 (2014); OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra 
note 31, at 15–16. 
 174. See Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 85, at 701–02; Bret Wells & Cym 
Lowell, Tax Base Erosion and Homeless Income: Collection at Source Is the Linchpin, 65 
TAX L. REV. 535, 538 n.10 (2012) [hereinafter Wells & Lowell, Tax Base Erosion]. 
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dividend income.175 Obviously, the U.S.-source income that funds the 
U.S.-deductible interest payments is not taxed in either the United 
States or the holder’s residence country. 
Hybrid mismatches can also be created by the use of so-called 
hybrid entities—i.e., business organizations that are treated as 
taxpayers in one country but disregarded as such in another 
country.176 In the U.S. earnings stripping context, this scenario arises 
when a U.S. corporation pays a business expense to a foreign 
organization that is recognized as a corporate entity under U.S. law 
but that is ignored by the foreign country and treated there as an 
unincorporated branch of the U.S. payor.177 In such a case, the 
payment bears no U.S. tax because it is deductible under U.S. law and 
it bears no foreign tax because the foreign jurisdiction regards the 
payment as a meaningless internal cash transfer from one part of the 
U.S. corporation to another component of the same corporation.178 
The problem with these results is that they yield income that is 
taxed nowhere. Thus, U.S. taxpayers have a distortive incentive to 
inefficiently pursue this income in lieu of taxable alternatives that are 
economically superior from a before-tax perspective. 
The significance of this hybrid mismatch issue and the full range 
of appropriate responses are matters that are outside the scope of this 
Article.179 For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the Obama 
Administration has proposed legislation that, generally speaking, 
would deny deductions to U.S. taxpayers for interest and royalty 
payments if the involvement of a hybrid instrument or a hybrid entity 
resulted in no income inclusion by the foreign related payee under the 
relevant foreign tax regime.180 The OECD is engaged in considering a 
similar proposal.181 
These proposals would be consistent with our analysis that the 
source country should be permitted to tax income that otherwise 
would be subject to double non-taxation by reason of these structured 
 
 175. See generally Lee A. Sheppard, BEPS Effects Without Implementation, 142 TAX 
NOTES 775 (2014) (explaining the use of debt/equity hybrid instruments). 
 176. See OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 31, at 15–16; J. COMM., INCOME SHIFTING 
AND TRANSFER PRICING, supra note 59, at 48. 
 177. See generally David D. Stewart, OECD Drafts Call for Domestic Law Solutions to 
Hybrid Mismatches, 142 TAX NOTES 1315 (2014) (explaining OECD concerns regarding 
hybrid entities). 
 178. Id. 
 179. For discussions of this issue, see generally id. (explaining the hybrid mismatch 
problem); Amanda Athanasiou, Hybrid Mismatch Proposals: Practical Problems Remain, 
74 TAX NOTES INT’L 1083 (2014) (same). 
 180. See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 14, at 10. 
 181. See OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 31, at 15–16. 
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arrangements. They are consistent with our view that USSub’s 
deductions have a normative basis when representing a real cost that 
must be taken into account to properly measure net income. In 
contrast, there is no normative basis for determining when a business 
organization should be treated as a separate taxpayer that can receive 
deductible payments and when it should be treated as an integral 
component of its economic owner so that payments to it by the owner 
are disregarded.182 Likewise, there is no normative guide for 
determining whether an investor should be treated as a creditor or an 
equity holder.183 These decisions are based primarily on 
considerations such as the relative convenience of collecting a tax 
from a single source (the business organization) instead of from 
multiple sources (the owners) and judgments about what kinds of 
investor rights and priorities are necessary to allow borrowers to 
adequately raise capital.184 When making such prudential decisions, it 
is appropriate to weigh the policy and revenue costs that result from 
permitting the creation of double non-taxed income. When the costs 
are too high, denying deductions for payments is an appropriate 
response. 
When considering the effect of disqualifying non-taxation, an 
important practical question is whether indirect taxation under 
controlled foreign company rules should be treated as taxation for 
purposes of a subject-to-tax test. This is an additional element in the 
inter-nation allocation of income. The issue generally arises when a 
payment is made to a company that is a brother-sister affiliate of a 
common parent company. If the payment is not subject to a 
meaningful tax in the hands of the company receiving the payment 
but is included in the common parent company’s income and 
subjected to tax under controlled foreign company rules applicable to 
the parent company, should the source country allow the deduction? 
In this circumstance, the conditions for the allocation of income to the 
investment location should be considered satisfied even though the 
tax is imposed by a third country on the common parent and not on 
the income recipient. This position is consistent with our approach of 
recognizing the single economic nature of the multinational business 
enterprise. In that circumstance, we would allow a deduction so that 
 
 182. See Schön, Part I, supra note 84, at 92. 
 183. See generally Wolfgang Schön, The Distinct Equity of the Debt-Equity Distinction, 
66 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 490 (Sept. 2012) [hereinafter Schön, Debt-Equity] (explaining 
that financial instruments are distributed along a debt/equity continuum that lacks sharp 
borders between debt and equity). 
 184. Id. 
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income constituting a normal return may be taxed in the investment 
location country. For this purpose, we are in essence treating the “rest 
of the world” as a single country. 
3.  Fees and Interest 
To what extent does the preceding analysis regarding intangibles 
also apply to the interest and management fees that USSub pays to 
UKCo in Example 1? It strikes us as appropriate to treat UKCo’s 
wage payments to its headquarters employees who furnish services to 
USSub as the equivalent of an investment with a U.K. location. Thus, 
the United Kingdom should have the primary right to tax a normal 
market return on that investment.185 This means that USSub should 
be allowed a deduction for that return in addition to its deduction, as 
explained in Part II.B.,186 for the portion of the fees that equal 
UKCo’s actual labor cost. However, USSub’s deduction should not 
exceed the sum of UKCo’s actual labor cost plus a normal markup on 
that cost because nothing in excess of that sum can be characterized 
as deductible under the Investment Location Primacy Principle.187 
Presumably, the deductible sum is the same as an arm’s-length 
amount. This means that transfer pricing law must carry the burden of 
determining the market rate return that should be included in 
USSub’s deduction. 
The internal cash that UKCo lends to USSub in Example 1 is 
also an investment, and UKCo can expect a return on that investment 
in the form of interest at a market rate. USSub’s use of the borrowed 
funds in the United States, however, produced that interest. Thus, the 
United States has the primary taxing claim to that interest,188 and the 
Investment Location Primacy Principle would not require that the 
 
 185. This is consistent with the widely applied principle that the source of services 
income for taxing purposes is the place where the services are performed. See I.R.C. 
§§ 861(a)(3), 862(a)(3) (2012); ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 81, at 
57; AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 53, at 45. 
 186. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 187. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 188. The UKCo retained earnings that were the source of the funds loaned to USSub 
in Example 1 were themselves a return on some investment by UKCo. The proper tax 
treatment of that investment return, however, was previously effected by the relevant 
taxing authority. At that point, the retained earnings were simply cash or its financial 
equivalent. When those after-tax retained earnings were loaned to USSub, the interest 
thereon became an entirely new and different investment return and under the facts of 
Example 1, it was earned in the United States. This conclusion is consistent with the 
widely applied principle that the source of interest income is generally the debtor’s 
residence country. See I.R.C. § 861(a)(1); ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX PROPOSALS, supra 
note 81, at 67; AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 
53, at 43. 
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United States give USSub a deduction for its interest payments to 
UKCo.189 In other words, both the No Deduction for Costless 
Payments Principle and the Investment Location Primacy Principle 
support the conclusion that USSub’s interest expense in Example 1 
should be nondeductible for U.S. tax purposes. 
D. Which Principle Prevails in the Case of a Conflict? 
In the immediately preceding discussion, the Investment 
Location Primacy Principle and the No Deduction for Costless 
Payments Principle gave identical answers regarding USSub’s interest 
payments on loans made by UKCo out of retained earnings—namely, 
no U.S. deduction by USSub. There is, however, a conflict between 
these principles with respect to royalties and fees for headquarters 
services. The No Deduction for Costless Payments Principle posits 
that a U.S. subsidiary’s deductions for use of its foreign parent’s self-
developed intangibles should be limited to the parent’s actual 
development costs. It also suggests that the subsidiary’s deduction for 
the cost of services provided by the foreign parent should not exceed 
the parent’s actual labor costs.190 In contrast, the Investment Location 
Primacy Principle would allow a subsidiary to deduct royalty 
 
 189. See also Wolfgang Schön, International Taxation for a Second-Best World (Part 
III), WORLD TAX J., Oct. 2010, at 227, 241 (2010) (interest payments on intra-group loans 
that do not involve outside financing “should be subject to the same treatment as 
dividends to controlling shareholders”). 
  Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a)(1) provides that 
[w]here one member of a group of controlled entities makes a loan or advance 
directly or indirectly to . . .  another member of such group and either charges no 
interest, or charges interest at a rate which is not equal to an arm’s length rate of 
interest . . .  the district director may make appropriate allocations to reflect an 
arm’s length rate of interest for the use of such loan or advance. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a)(1) (2011). If this regulation is intended to reflect a U.S. decision 
that the USSub-UKCo MNE is entitled to have the United States recognize a deductible 
arm’s-length interest payment from USSub to UKCo in Example 1, we conclude that the 
decision is wrong as a matter of sound policy. However, we believe that the words “may” 
and “appropriate” in the preceding quotation mean that this regulation is not intended to 
create such an entitlement. We believe that these words should be read to permit 
disallowance of a USSub deduction for the interest paid to UKCo in Example 1. This view 
is supported by the following language from Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(1) (2013): “The 
purpose of section 482 is to ensure that taxpayers clearly reflect income . . . and to prevent 
the avoidance of taxes,” and by the following language from Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(2): 
“The district director may make allocations between or among the members of a 
controlled group if a controlled taxpayer has not reported its true taxable income.” We 
maintain that in Example 1, USCo’s true taxable income would not be reported if it were 
allowed to deduct its interest payments because those payments do not represent a real 
cost for reasons outlined in Part II of this Article. 
 190. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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payments for use of its foreign parent’s self-developed intangibles up 
to the lesser of a market return on the parent’s development costs or 
an arm’s-length amount.191 It also would allow the subsidiary’s 
deduction for services fees to be the sum of the parent’s actual labor 
costs plus a normal market return thereon.192 
Thus, the preceding conflict must be resolved. Article 9 of the 
widely adopted OECD Model Income Tax Treaty states the 
overarching principle and international norm that where related 
corporations deal with each other, as in the case of USSub and UKCo 
in Example 1, then their incomes from their dealings with each other 
shall be calculated as if they had been independent parties dealing at 
arm’s length.193 The purpose of the deductions that are allowed to 
USSub under the Investment Location Primacy Principle is to give 
the United Kingdom the same primary right to taxing jurisdiction that 
it would have if UKCo were dealing with USSub at arm’s length and 
insisting on a normal market rate of return with respect to the 
services and intangible property provided by UKCo to USSub (after 
application of the subject-to-tax limitation on the principle).194 The 
Investment Location Primacy Principle is a form of jurisdiction-to-tax 
rule whereas the No Deduction for Costless Payments Principle is a 
base defining rule.195 Generally, jurisdictional rules should trump base 
defining deduction disallowance rules.196 Consequently, we conclude 
that the allowance of deductions under the Investment Location 
Primacy Principle should trump a disallowance required by the No 
Deduction for Costless Payments Principle. When, however, an 
expense of USSub represents a real cost, a U.S. deduction should be 
allowed even if the effect is to allocate income to another country. 
Thus, interest paid by USSub to unrelated parties in Example 2 
should be deductible by USSub even though the related debt 
represents an investment by the lender in the United States.197 This 
result is appropriate because the U.S.-source tax on corporate profits 
 
 191. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 192. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 193. OECD, MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 151, at art. 9. 
 194. See supra text accompanying notes 143–44, 146, 158–59. 
 195. Compare supra Part II.B.1, with supra Part II.C.1. 
 196. See ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 81, at 7; AVI-YONAH, 
INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 53, at 5–6, 89–90. 
 197. The general international income tax rule is that interest has its source in the 
debtor’s residence country. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 861(a)(1) (2012); ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX 
PROPOSALS, supra note 81, at 66–67; Schön, Debt-Equity, supra note 183, at 500. The 
allowance of the interest deduction would be subject to the otherwise applicable interest 
expense allocation and allowance rules. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163, 861(b). 
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is a net income tax, and deductions for real costs are required to 
measure net income.198 
E. Summary 
Thus, the end result of the effort to develop a policy baseline is 
the conclusion that the United States should allow deductions for 
payments for expenses (but not capital expenditures) made by U.S. 
subsidiaries to foreign parent corporations if the deduction is 
necessary to properly allocate income between the United States and 
the foreign parent’s residence country. If a deduction is not required 
under this principle, then it should be allowed only to the extent that 
it is for a real current expense as opposed to a costless foreign related 
party payment, a distinction explained in Part II.B.199 
F. Double Taxation 
But what if the United Kingdom taxes USSub’s payments of 
interest, royalties, and fees to UKCo? To the extent that these items 
were nondeductible for U.S. tax purposes, they would also be part of 
USSub’s U.S. taxable income.200 The resulting double taxation would 
have a chilling effect on UKCo’s participation in the U.S. market.201 
There is, however, a well-settled solution to this problem—customary 
international law requires the United Kingdom to resolve the double 
tax problem with a credit for the U.S. tax or an exemption for the 
interest, royalties, and fees.202 
III.  SEARCHING FOR PROXIES AND ROUGH JUSTICE RULES 
A. The Problem 
The preceding discussion of a normative baseline suggests that a 
theoretically correct approach to earnings stripping requires the 
following difficult allocations regarding payments by foreign-
controlled U.S. subsidiaries to related foreign parties: 
1. Interest payments must be divided between (i) interest on 
loans to a U.S. subsidiary from purely intra-MNE funds 
(nondeductible interest) and (ii) interest on loans to the U.S 
subsidiary from funds supplied to the MNE by third-party 
 
 198. See supra Part II.B. USSub’s deduction is also required by the United States-U.K. 
income tax treaty. See U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 25, para. 3. 
 199. See supra Part II.B. 
 200. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 139–44. 
 201. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing, supra note 9, at 401–02. 
 202. See id. at 402–03. 
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creditors (deductible interest to the extent that the arm’s-length 
benchmark is not exceeded); 
2. Royalty payments must be divided between (i) a normal 
return on the related foreign developer’s costs (deductible), (ii) 
royalties that do no more than reimburse the MNE for royalties 
paid to an unrelated party for intangibles licensed by the MNE 
to the U.S. subsidiary (deductible), (iii) economic rents 
(unresolved treatment), and (iv) all other royalty payments by 
the U.S. subsidiary to the MNE (nondeductible); and 
3. Payments for services provided by the MNE must be divided 
between (i) a normal return on services costs (deductible), (ii) 
payments that reimburse the MNE for actual services costs 
(deductible), and (iii) any amount in excess of the arm’s-length 
ceiling (nondeductible). 
As discussed above,203 we would separately allocate economic rents 
formally earned in the country of source. 
These are difficult, complex allocations and they rely in part on 
transfer pricing law that is widely and properly regarded as 
problematic.204 These problems are magnified in the case of a large 
MNE with many subsidiaries and many intra-MNE transactions.205 
Thus, rules intended to achieve theoretically correct results may be 
objectionable on the grounds that their enforcement and compliance 
costs are too high and that sufficient accuracy cannot be achieved at 
any cost. Moreover, a rule of complete disallowance for interest 
payments on loans of purely intra-MNE funds may be politically 
impossible. Consequently, it is appropriate to search for proxy rules 
and rough justice approaches that are an acceptable compromise 
between practical realities and theoretical correctness. The remainder 
of Part III discusses this topic. 
B. Section 163(j) As a Rough Justice Provision 
1.  Identifying the Loopholes 
Although earnings stripping can be effected to some extent 
through payments of royalties and services fees, the largest amount is 
 
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 148–53. 
 204. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 93. 
 205. These problems would not be made easier by U.S. adoption of a territorial tax 
regime that limited the U.S. corporate tax base to U.S.-source income. The difficult 
allocations described in the text would still be required in order to make theoretically 
correct distinctions between U.S.-source income and exempt foreign-source income. See 
Wells, Whack-a-Mole, supra note 11, at 1433. 
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accomplished through interest payments.206 We have previously 
explained that § 163(j) is intended to constrain this type of earnings 
stripping by limiting interest deductions but that the § 163(j) 
constraint is so loose that it is not significantly effective.207 Perhaps a 
practical solution for the largest part of the earnings stripping 
problem is to tighten the parts of § 163(j) that trigger its application. 
We will now investigate that approach. 
The present version of § 163(j) prevents a U.S. corporation from 
currently deducting its disqualified interest expense for any year with 
respect to which its year-end debt-to-equity ratio is greater than 1.5 to 
1.208 For this purpose, disqualified interest expense is calculated by 
computing the part of each related party interest payment during the 
year that is proportional to any treaty reduction in the U.S. 
withholding tax on that payment and then aggregating those parts.209 
However, the deduction disallowance cannot exceed the 
corporation’s excess interest expense for the year.210 Under § 163(j), 
excess interest expense is the amount by which net interest expense 
(i.e., disqualified interest payments plus all other interest expense for 
the year minus the year’s includible interest income) exceeds 50% of 
adjusted taxable income.211 For this purpose, adjusted taxable income 
is taxable income for the year increased by net interest expense and 
certain other items.212 
 
 206. See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra note 15, at 7, 21. 
 207. As stated by Jasper Cummings: 
  It seems that foreign acquirers have become adept at working around section 
163(j). For example, the prospectus filed for the Chinese company purchase of 
Smithfield Foods states that the cash will be provided by the Bank of China and 
Morgan Stanley. The prospectus says the capitalization of the parent will be 40% 
equity. That strongly suggests that the parties are intending to fit in the 1.5 to 1 
debt-to-equity safe harbor for section 163(j). Alternatively, the 50% of adjusted 
taxable income limitation can be easily accommodated in many cases. 
  Regulations under section 163(j) were proposed in 1991 and have never been 
finalized. The proposed regulations are rarely cited, and section 163(j) itself is 
seldom cited. This supports the view that while the section must be observed, even 
the IRS considers it to be an ineffective preventer of deductions for interest paid 
to foreign affiliates . . . . 
Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Income Stripping by Interest Deductions, 141 TAX NOTES 971, 
978 (2013). 
 208. I.R.C. § 163(j)(1)(A), (2)(A) (2012). For a detailed discussion of the earnings 
stripping rules in § 163(j) and the proposed Treasury regulations issued under that 
provision, see 2 KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 23, ¶ C3.04[5][d]. 
 209. I.R.C. § 163(j)(3), (5)(B). 
 210. Id. § 163(j)(1)(A). 
 211. Id. § 163(j)(2)(B), (6)(B). 
 212. Id. § 163(j)(6)(A). 
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The current § 163(j) limitations are generally intended to mimic 
the cash flow debt payment coverage ratios that routinely are used by 
lenders in credit agreements to assure that the borrower has sufficient 
cash generating power to repay the loan.213 The carryover of 
suspended interest allows the borrower flexibility and, assuming 
constant cash flows, allows suspended deductions to be recouped as 
debt is paid down.214 The limit of 50% of adjusted taxable income is 
an arbitrary percentage that has not been reconsidered in light of 
events occurring since its enactment in 1989 (including the 2008 
financial crisis) and simply takes as given the remarkable latitude 
afforded taxpayers to insert debt into MNE groups.215 Our prior 
analysis demonstrates that, in essence, the § 163(j) rules elevate a 
weak proxy for determining an arm’s-length interest amount over 
considerations of inter-nation equity.216 
The preceding summary shows that in the following situations, 
§ 163(j) allows U.S. subsidiaries to deduct interest payments that 
should not be deductible under the policy baseline that was 
developed in Part II of this Article: 
(i) The U.S. subsidiary manages to keep its debt-to-equity 
ratio from exceeding 1.5 to 1, a fact that is irrelevant under the 
Part II policy baseline with respect to interest; 
(ii) The U.S. subsidiary manages to keep its disqualified 
interest expense from being greater than a safe harbor ceiling 
defined as the point at which the corporation’s net interest 
expense for the year exceeds 50% of its adjusted taxable 
income for the year, another fact that is irrelevant under the 
policy baseline; and 
(iii) The U.S. subsidiary’s interest payments are not subject to a 
treaty-imposed reduction in the U.S. withholding tax, a point 
that is also meaningless under the policy baseline. 
In addition, § 163(j) allows an affected corporation to carry 
nondeductible interest forward to future years when its deductibility 
will continue to be governed by § 163(j).217 Finally, § 163(j) applies 
only to interest deductions and does not impose any restrictions on a 
 
 213. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 567, 569–70 (1989) (Conf. Rep.); see also Hey, 
supra note 77, at 342–43. 
 214. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 564–65, 567–68. 
 215. See id. at 567–68, 569–70; see also Shay, Mr. Secretary, supra note 14, at 474 
(discussing Barclays Bank research analysts’ report that assumes a foreign-owned 
Walgreens could add intercompany debt up to the § 163(j) limit). 
 216. See supra text accompanying notes 68–73, 206–12. 
 217. See I.R.C. § 163(j)(1)(B) (2012). 
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U.S. subsidiary’s deductions for payments of royalties and services 
fees to foreign related parties.218 Indeed, its design is based solely on a 
debt paradigm.219 
Section 163(j) is under-inclusive in several respects and, in those 
cases, it needs to be strengthened. On the other hand, the present 
version of § 163(j) is also over-inclusive in that it denies deductions 
for interest payments that do not come within the loopholes described 
in (i)–(iii) above but that do represent a real expense as explained in 
Part II.B. Accordingly, in considering whether modifications that 
strengthen § 163(j) might make it an acceptable approach, its over-
inclusiveness as well as its under-inclusiveness must be taken into 
account. We now turn to that issue. 
2.  Strengthening Section 163(j) 
To explore approaches for strengthening § 163(j), it will be 
helpful first to illustrate the effects of the current version of that 
provision. Examples 5, 6, and 7 serve this purpose. In each case, we 
assume for simplicity that the USSub stock is the only asset of the 
foreign parent. 
Example 5: ForCo, a foreign corporation, owns all the shares of 
USSub, a U.S. resident corporation. ForCo paid $100,000 for 
the USSub stock and provided USSub with the remainder of its 
capital by borrowing $900,000 from an unrelated bank and 
lending this money to USSub on arm’s-length terms. All debt 
formalities are observed. For year one, USSub has adjusted 
taxable income of $100,000, and it pays $90,000 of interest on 
the loan from ForCo. This payment constitutes USSub’s net 
interest expense for the year, and it bears no U.S. withholding 
tax because of an applicable treaty. ForCo pays the entire 
$90,000 interest receipt to its bank lender. 
USSub’s debt-to-equity ratio is considerably in excess of 1.5 to 
1. In addition, the tax-free interest payment is disqualified 
interest. Therefore, the $40,000 amount by which the $90,000 
interest payment exceeds $50,000 (i.e., 50% of USSub’s 
adjusted taxable income) is nondeductible interest for year 1 
under the present version of § 163(j), even though it was 
attributable to debt owed to an independent party. In this 
factual context § 163(j) is over-inclusive. 
 
 218. See id. § 163(j)(1)(A). 
 219. See id. 
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In our view, this result is incorrect. The $90,000 of interest paid 
to ForCo and then paid onward to the bank lender was a real expense 
rather than a costless foreign related party expense, and deduction 
thereof should have been fully allowed instead of being limited to 
$50,000. The $40,000 deduction disallowance would be correct only if 
there were some policy standard that objectively characterized 
$40,000 of USSub’s $90,000 of interest expense as normatively 
excessive even though the facts of the example state that the full 
$90,000 was an arm’s-length charge entirely attributable to unrelated 
party debt and that all debt formalities were observed. We are not 
aware of any such objective policy standard.220 Thus, present § 163(j) 
is over-inclusive in Example 5. 
Example 6: If, however, ForCo’s $900,000 loan to USSub had 
come entirely from ForCo’s retained earnings, then USSub’s 
$90,000 interest payment to ForCo would have been a costless 
foreign related party expense for which no deduction should be 
allowed. Nevertheless, present § 163(j) would allow USSub to 
deduct the $50,000 of its interest payment that did not exceed 
50% of USSub’s adjusted taxable income. In this factual 
context, § 163(j) is under-inclusive. 
Now consider a middle ground version of Examples 5 and 6. 
Example 7: The facts are identical to Example 5 except that 
one-half of the $900,000 loaned by ForCo to USSub came from 
ForCo’s retained earnings, and the other one-half was 
borrowed on arm’s-length terms from an independent bank 
with both debts bearing the same 10% interest rate. Again, 
USSub’s deduction for its $90,000 interest payment would be 
limited to $50,000 by present § 163(j), but that is $5,000 too 
much. In principle, only $45,000 would be properly deductible 
because only that portion of the interest was allocable to third-
party debt. The remaining amount is a costless foreign related 
party payment that should be nondeductible. Thus, in this 
scenario, current § 163(j) got the right answer with respect to 
$45,000 of USSub’s $90,000 interest payment and the wrong 
answer regarding $5,000 of the payment. 
 
 220. See Hey, supra note 77, at 344 (“The key issue in respect of any legislation limited 
to ‘excessive’ intra-group interest is the lack of a normative basis for the definition of an 
adequate level of debt.”). Shareholder loans that arguably exceed the debtor corporation’s 
reasonable expected repayment capacity raise the question of whether the shareholder-
creditors have an unqualified intention to enforce repayment or instead are making a 
disguised equity investment. This issue does not usually arise when the creditor is an 
unrelated party dealing at arm’s length with the debtor corporation. 
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No principled rationale explains the results of these scenarios. 
Clearly, current § 163(j)’s operation in Examples 5, 6, and 7 is 
dependent on the largely unprincipled interaction of the chief 
components of the § 163(j)(1)(A) excess interest expense limitation—
net interest expense and 50% of adjusted taxable income—221neither 
of which has any necessary connection to the theoretically correct 
approach for determining the deductibility of interest payments by 
U.S. subsidiaries to foreign parents. We could present multiple 
additional examples, but, in our judgment, those we have offered 
show that current § 163(j) is too arbitrary in its operation to function 
as an acceptable rough justice substitute for a principled approach to 
limiting earnings stripping. 
We can now consider addressing these problems by 
strengthening § 163(j) along the various margins identified above. A 
useful place to begin is with the feature of § 163(j) that excuses all 
corporate debtors who prevent their debt-to-equity ratios from 
exceeding 1.5 to 1.222 If that ratio were lowered or even eliminated, 
more corporate debtors would be subject to the § 163(j) interest 
deduction limitation.223 
Note, however, that the 1.5 to 1 ceiling did not play any role in 
the problematic results of Examples 5, 6, and 7, because the debtor’s 
debt-to-equity ratio was greater than 1.5 to 1 in all three cases. In 
other words, the erratic results in those three examples would have 
occurred even if the debt-to-equity requirement of § 163(j) had been 
reduced to less than 1.5 to 1 or eliminated. Thus, in our view, 
tweaking § 163(j)’s leverage ceiling is not sufficient to cure the defects 
illustrated in Examples 5, 6, and 7.224 
 
 221. See I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(B). 
 222. See id. § 163(j)(2)(A). 
 223. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 567, 569–70 (1989) (finding the 1.5 to 1 
debt-equity ratio to excuse many corporations with typical capital structures from any 
potential disallowances and most net interest payments to be well under this threshold); 
Cummings, supra note 86 (discussing the benefits of consolidating affiliated foreign 
corporations owned by one common parent for tax filing purposes). 
 224. For purposes of § 163(j), a subsidiary’s debts that are owed to its parent are 
generally taken into account in full for purposes of determining the subsidiary’s debt-to-
equity ratio even if the parent obtained the loan funds by borrowing at arm’s length from 
an unrelated lender. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.163(j)-3(b), CCH, STANDARD FED. TAX 
REP. 23355–56 (2013). This conflicts with our conclusion that when the unrelated-party 
debt produces a real interest cost for the parent and the subsidiary’s interest payments are 
a reimbursement of that cost, the disallowance scheme of § 163(j) should not apply to the 
subsidiary’s interest expense. See supra text accompanying note 78. More broadly, this 
indicates that the 1.5 to 1 debt-to-equity ratio is not a useful proxy for distinguishing 
between real interest expenses and interest payments that are costless foreign related 
party expenses. 
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An additional possibility is to reduce present § 163(j)’s 50% of 
adjusted taxable income safe harbor to something less—say 30%.225 If 
that had been the case in Examples 5 and 7, then the safe harbor 
ceiling in both examples would be $30,000 instead of $50,000. Thus, in 
Example 5, $60,000 of USSub’s interest payment would be 
nondeductible, and only $30,000 would be allowed. But this is even 
less correct than the $40,000 deduction disallowance/$50,000 
allowance result under the 50% ceiling that applied in the original 
facts of Example 5 because, as previously explained, the correct 
answer under the policy baseline for this “real expense” interest is 
zero deduction disallowance/$90,000 allowance on account of the 
related debt being owed to an independent creditor. 
Example 7 presents a similar problematic outcome when a 30% 
(instead of 50%) safe harbor ceiling is assumed. Again, USSub’s 
interest deduction would be disallowed to the extent of $60,000, and 
$30,000 would be allowed. However, because one-half of the $90,000 
interest expense is a costless foreign related party payment as 
explained in Part II, the nondeductible amount should have been 
$45,000, and the deductible amount should have been the remaining 
$45,000. Here, the deduction disallowance is $15,000 too large, and 
the allowed amount is $15,000 too small. 
The preceding observations should likely be disregarded if 
empirical data can be found that shows that the interest deductions 
properly disallowed by the current version of § 163(j) are 
overwhelmingly greater than inappropriately disallowed deductions. 
In that event, the over-inclusive effect of a tightened safe harbor 
ceiling might be small enough to constitute an acceptable cost. That is 
an empirical question that should be investigated. Although 
reductions in its existing 50% safe harbor ceiling would provide 
enhanced protection to the U.S. tax base, they would not cure erratic 
effects of current § 163(j). 
A final margin that suggests a possibility for strengthening 
§ 163(j) is its feature that makes it inapplicable to interest payments 
in the cross-border context unless they enjoy a treaty-based reduction 
in the 30% U.S. withholding tax.226 This exception seems inconsistent 
with § 163(j)’s anti-earnings stripping purpose because even if there 
were no withholding rate reduction, so that the full 30% U.S. tax 
applied to an interest payment, a U.S. subsidiary with a 35% U.S. 
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marginal income tax rate could still create a meaningful five 
percentage point tax advantage by incurring a 30% withholding tax 
on deductible interest payments to a foreign parent. This feature of 
§ 163(j) seems ripe for modification, or, alternatively, the withholding 
tax rate could be increased. 
Nevertheless, the withholding tax treaty reduction requirement 
played no role in creating the aberrant § 163(j) results that are 
illustrated in Examples 5, 6, and 7 because those examples assumed 
that an applicable treaty had reduced the U.S. withholding tax to 
zero, thereby making this requirement irrelevant. Thus, § 163(j) 
cannot be amended to achieve the appropriate results by tinkering 
with or eliminating the presently existing treaty withholding tax 
reduction requirement. 
In our judgment, a version of § 163(j) that is tightened on any or 
all of the three margins discussed above would still produce results 
that are erratic in terms of the Part II policy baseline. In addition, 
there seems to be no way to make § 163(j)’s structure applicable to 
royalty and services fees payments.227 Indeed, the only thing that can 
be said for the present iteration of § 163(j) is that its continued 
existence may be better than allowing totally unrestrained earnings 
stripping involving interest deductions. Nonetheless, it is difficult to 
see how § 163(j), even if amended, will have any significant role to 
play in developing a comprehensive and coherent approach to dealing 
with earnings stripping. 
C. An Offsetting Withholding Tax As an Alternative to Deduction 
Disallowance (The Wells/Lowell Proposal) 
Commentators Bret Wells and Cym Lowell have proposed 
addressing the earnings stripping problem by imposing a U.S. “base-
protecting surtax” on all deductible payments to foreign related 
parties.228 Although they do not fully state the details, they do indicate 
that the U.S. payor would withhold the tax at the time of the 
payment, and the tax would be calibrated “to collect upfront the 
expected U.S. tax that should be due with respect to the residual 
profits that are represented by the base erosion payment.”229 
The two authors acknowledge that actually calibrating the tax so 
that it does no more, and no less, than remove the reward of earnings 
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stripping is a serious challenge.230 Over-inclusiveness and under-
inclusiveness are both potential problems with their proposal. That 
challenge is avoided by adopting the nondeduction approach towards 
earnings stripping payments that we have generally advocated in this 
Article. 
Of equal importance is the point that if the withholding tax is to 
have a sound, principled basis, it will not apply to payments identified 
as deductible under the analysis in Part II.B. Thus, the Wells and 
Lowell proposal will involve the same allocation complexities as the 
nondeduction approach. Thus, although we acknowledge that the 
Wells and Lowell proposal would be an improvement over existing 
law and is more coherent than current law § 163(j), we conclude that, 
on balance, the nondeduction approach that we have developed in 
this Article is preferable. 
D. Should Nondeduction Be Limited to Payments into Low-Tax 
Countries? 
Notwithstanding the foregoing comprehensive theoretical 
analysis, we recognize that the earnings stripping problem is most 
acute with respect to deductible payments made to foreign related 
parties that are resident in low-tax countries.231 Given that fact, would 
a rule making deductibility contingent on the imposition of a 
meaningful foreign residence country tax be a good alternative to a 
more theoretically correct nondeductibility rule that requires difficult 
allocations? This alternative rule would seem to be over-inclusive 
because it would presumably apply to all payments to parties resident 
in low-tax countries even if the payments should be deductible in 
principle under the analysis in Part II.B. More importantly, this 
alternative also would be under-inclusive because it would require the 
United States to allow deductions for payments into high-tax 
countries even though the deductions erode the U.S. tax base. Thus, 
in our view, this approach would be an improvement over present 
law, but, before adopting it, other more precise and comprehensive 
proposals should be seriously considered. 
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E. Lodin’s Proposal 
Swedish Professor Sven-Olof Lodin has developed another 
approach for dealing with earnings stripping techniques involving 
interest and royalty payments.232 Under Professor Lodin’s proposal, 
the deductions for interest or royalties of legal entities would be 
replaced by an equivalent inverted tax credit.233 In the case of interest 
or royalties paid to unrelated payees, the credit amount would be 
based on the current top domestic Swedish corporate tax rate of 
26.3% (i.e., that rate multiplied by the borrower’s or licensee’s 
interest or royalty costs).234 In the case of interest or royalties paid to 
related payees, the credit amount would be at the rate that normally 
applies to the lender’s or licensor’s interest or royalty income (i.e., 
that rate multiplied by the borrower’s or licensee’s interest or royalty 
costs), but not in excess of the current top domestic Swedish 
corporate tax rate of 26.3%.235 The proposal would allow a company 
that reports a loss for the year in which the interest or royalty costs 
are incurred to carry the credit forward in the same manner as losses 
are carried forward under Swedish law.236 The proposal also would 
apply to interest on loans that are indirectly made “by associated 
companies through guarantees or loans, or their equivalent, to the 
direct lender.”237 The purpose of this proposal is to eliminate the tax 
arbitrage on related party interest or royalty payments that are 
deductible by the payor but not taxable or taxable at only a low rate 
in the hands of the related payee.238 
This proposal, if adopted by the United States, would be a 
significant improvement over current U.S. tax law. However, several 
defects undercut its effectiveness. First, as Professor Lodin 
acknowledges, a serious weakness of this proposal, as applied to 
interest deductions, is the ease with which companies using 
intermediaries in high-tax countries that had not adopted a similar 
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proposal could circumvent this proposal.239 In those cases, it would be 
difficult for the tax authorities to follow the chain of intermediaries to 
determine the final beneficiary of the interest payments.240 Second, 
unlike our nondeduction for costless payments approach discussed 
above, the Lodin proposal continues to allow income to be stripped 
from the domestic tax base, but it reduces the incentive to do so by 
limiting the tax benefit of the U.S. tax deduction to no more than the 
foreign related party’s tax cost.241 Thus, unless the related party’s tax 
cost were zero, deductible interest or royalty payments to foreign 
related parties would still result in a revenue loss to the United States, 
even though the payments do not represent a real cost. Third, to 
implement its limitation on the tax benefits of the earnings stripping 
interest and royalties expense deductions, the Lodin proposal seems 
to require calculation of the related foreign payee’s “normal” 
effective tax rate with respect to such items.242 This approach seems to 
introduce the complexities of determining effective tax rates under 
Code provisions such as § 954(b)(4).243 Finally, unlike our proposed 
analytical framework in this Article, Professor Lodin’s proposal does 
not deal with services fees payments between related parties. Thus, 
on balance, we conclude that the approach that we have developed in 
this Article is a more comprehensive and effective way of dealing with 
the earnings stripping problem. 
F. The Obama Administration’s 2016 Budget Proposal Regarding 
Thin Capitalization 
As previously explained, § 163(j) does not limit a U.S. 
corporation’s current deductions for related party interest payments 
unless the corporation’s year-end debt-to-equity ratio exceeds 1.5 to 1 
and the corporation’s net interest expense breaches a 50% of adjusted 
taxable income ceiling for the year.244 Thus, so long as a U.S. 
corporation’s debt level and interest expense are kept within these 
limits, borrowing by related corporations that comprise a foreign 
MNE can be structured so that the MNE’s debt and related interest 
deductions are disproportionately located in high-taxed U.S. 
subsidiaries instead of low-taxed foreign subsidiaries. The Obama 
Administration’s 2016 fiscal year revenue proposals include a 
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recommendation to limit the possibility of disproportionately 
leveraging the U.S. subsidiaries of a foreign MNE.245 
The Administration’s proposal provides that the U.S. interest 
expense deduction of a member of a group of related corporations 
covered by consolidated financial statements would be limited to the 
sum of two components: (1) the member’s interest income and (2) the 
proportion of the group’s worldwide net interest expense, computed 
under U.S. tax principles, which is the same as the member’s 
proportion of the group’s worldwide earnings (computed by adding 
back the group’s net interest expense and certain other items).246 
Although the proposed rule’s coverage would exclude financial 
services entities and groups of related corporations with less than $5 
million of net interest expense,247 coverage would be very broad 
because MNEs generally use consolidated financial statements, which 
is the principal touchstone for determining when the new proposal 
would apply to a non-excluded entity.248 However, the proposal 
provides that corporations subject to the new rule would be exempt 
from the § 163(j) limitation.249 Thus, the effect of the proposal would 
be to substantially curtail the application of § 163(j), without actually 
repealing or amending it. 
On the positive side, the proposal would strengthen the restraints 
on interest deductions in that it would apply to corporations that 
presently escape § 163(j) because their debt is managed so that it 
avoids a breach of at least one of the § 163(j) limits referred to above. 
Most inverted U.S. corporations seem to fall into this category,250 and 
so the proposal would likely have a restraining effect on tax-driven 
inversions. 
The proposal’s deduction limitation would affect interest paid on 
debt to unrelated parties and would conflict with the Part II policy 
baseline discussed above.251 This may be justified on inter-nation 
revenue allocation grounds, where the third-party debt is “over 
allocated” to the United States to take advantage of the higher value 
of the deduction at current U.S. corporate tax rates. 
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The first component of the proposal’s limitation effectively 
allows tracing to the extent that the U.S. subsidiary has interest 
income. By privileging interest income in this way, it permits higher 
levels of indebtedness in relation to the non-interest bearing assets of 
the U.S. subsidiary borrower. Although this does not involve shifting 
income to other countries, it would, nevertheless, reduce the U.S. tax 
base by increasing the debt allowable in relation to non-interest 
bearing business assets that generate higher margins. Thus, this first 
component of the proposal reduces its effectiveness in remedying 
earnings stripping involving interest deductions. 
The proposal also would allow U.S. subsidiaries to elect into an 
alternative interest deduction limitation defined as 10% of adjusted 
taxable income.252 This election, like any other, is a one-way ratchet 
that would create gaming opportunities for well-advised taxpayers; 
the proposal would probably be improved by eliminating this 
election. Finally, the proposal does not apply to services fees 
payments or royalties,253 so, of course, it does not even attempt to do 
anything about earnings stripping involving those types of payments. 
On balance, the Administration’s proposal appears to be an 
improvement over current law § 163(j). However, it is not clear that 
the proposal need supersede § 163(j) nor is it clear that the proposal is 
a more effective limitation on earnings stripping interest payments 
than § 163(j) strengthened along the lines suggested in Part III.B.2. 
G. Proportional Allocation 
A reasonably simple and workable solution to the investment 
allocation required by Part II.B.1 may lie in the principles that 
“money is fungible and that interest expense is attributable to all 
activities and property regardless of any specific purpose for incurring 
an obligation on which interest is paid.”254 Using this principle and the 
principles of § 864(e)(2) and the temporary regulations under § 861,255 
a U.S. subsidiary’s share of a foreign-controlled MNE’s worldwide 
interest expense on debt owed to independent parties could be 
allocated to the U.S. subsidiary by referring to the ratio of the 
subsidiary’s assets to the MNE’s worldwide assets, and then deducted 
by the subsidiary. The subsidiary’s interest expense in excess of this 
allocation would then be considered interest on intra-MNE debt that 
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is nondeductible. The subsidiary, however, would not be allowed to 
deduct more than its actual interest payments. Anti-abuse rules would 
be required to disregard spurious third-party debt involving loans 
from a putative independent lender to the MNE followed by a loan 
back to the putative independent lender or involving offsetting funds 
deposited with the putative independent lender by the MNE. These 
anti-abuse rules would admittedly increase the complexity of this 
allocation approach, but workable rules of this variety have been 
developed in other areas.256 
Under this approach, all U.S. subsidiary interest payments would 
be classified as deductible or nondeductible in the correct amounts 
and the over- and under-inclusive results of current § 163(j), as 
illustrated in Examples 5, 6, and 7, would be avoided. This approach 
could be designed to work in conjunction with rules for allocating 
interest expense of the U.S. branch of a foreign corporation. In our 
view, this approach is the preferred way to deal with earnings 
stripping interest payments. 
IV.  DO REVENUE CONSIDERATIONS MAKE ALL OF THE ABOVE 
SUBSTANTIALLY POINTLESS? 
If U.S. corporations receive more interest from foreign related 
parties than foreign related parties receive from U.S. corporations, 
would the United States be better off by adopting a treaty negotiation 
policy that treats interest payments by domestic corporations to 
foreign related parties as fully deductible for purposes of taxing 
corporate profits in exchange for treaty partner reciprocity? Indeed, 
the United States has already adopted a similar approach to the 
withholding tax on cross-border interest payments by pursuing a 
treaty negotiation policy of reciprocally reducing that tax to zero,257 
even in the case of interest payments that are merely costless intra-
MNE transfers under the analysis explained in Part II.B. 
Suppose that it were the case that U.S. corporations received 
more interest from foreign related parties than vice versa and the 
United States agreed by treaties to allow a full deduction for interest 
paid by U.S. corporations to foreign related parties, thus removing 
the interest from the U.S. corporate tax base, in exchange for foreign 
treaty partners doing the converse. In such a case, the United States 
could fully tax the inbound interest payments without having to allow 
a foreign tax credit. The resulting revenue would, in theory, exceed 
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the revenue lost from the United States allowing unlimited 
deductions for interest payments by U.S. corporations to foreign 
related parties. This might leave the United States in a better revenue 
position than if it and its treaty partners took vigorous steps to limit 
deductions for earnings stripping interest payments. Although that is 
an empirical question that we do not resolve, the imprecise data that 
is available indicates that U.S. corporations probably do not receive 
more interest from foreign related parties than they pay to such 
parties.258 
Moreover, even if the United States would achieve a net revenue 
gain from modifying its treaty network to achieve unlimited 
reciprocal deductions for earnings stripping interest payments, 
important negative aspects of earnings stripping explained in Section 
I.F. would remain. Specifically, U.S. resident corporations that 
compete with foreign MNEs in the U.S. market, but that are not 
subsidiaries of foreign corporations, cannot generate income that 
escapes U.S. tax by earnings stripping.259 This is the case because 
these independent U.S. resident corporations have no foreign parent 
to which they can make deductible payments. Thus, they are at a 
disadvantage in the U.S. market with respect to foreign MNEs, and 
this disadvantage would be increased if the United States allowed 
unlimited earnings stripping. This disadvantage would depress the 
profits of purely domestic U.S. corporations. It also would create a 
diminution of the U.S tax base that would pro tanto offset the 
revenue gain that might arise from reciprocal unlimited earnings 
stripping. Regardless of the size of that offset, the discrimination 
suffered by purely domestic U.S. corporations would be problematic. 
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There is an additional consequence from the foregoing 
disadvantage to independent U.S. corporations that do business 
exclusively in the United States. That consequence is a tax-subsidized 
incentive for U.S. corporations to invert and for foreign corporations 
to create or acquire U.S. corporations so that they can reap the 
earnings stripping benefit that is unavailable to purely U.S. domestic 
corporations. This incentive would be increased by a U.S. policy of 
unlimited deductions for earnings stripping interest payments and the 
result would be additional base erosion that would pro tanto offset 
the hoped-for revenue gain from unlimited reciprocal earnings 
stripping deductions. 
In our judgment, the preceding points mean that the United 
States should not move to a treaty policy that accommodates 
reciprocal unlimited earnings stripping deductions. Even if there were 
quantitative evidence of a revenue gain, we would be reluctant to 
endorse a policy that systemically favored MNEs over domestic 
businesses. 
CONCLUSION 
The term “corporate inversion” is used to identify several 
transactional forms by which U.S. resident corporations are converted 
into foreign corporations or into U.S. subsidiaries of foreign 
corporations. These transactions are currently a large concern to U.S. 
tax policy makers, and a lively debate is in progress regarding the best 
way forward. 
From a tax standpoint, corporate inversions are driven by the 
triple objectives of (1) enabling inverting U.S. corporations to escape 
U.S. taxation of their foreign-source income, (2) enabling U.S. 
corporations to effectively repatriate foreign-source income without 
paying a U.S. tax on such income, and (3) enabling those U.S. 
corporations to move U.S.-source income out of the U.S. tax base by 
means of deductible expense payments—a tactic known as cross-
border earnings stripping. In previous work, we have explained how 
the first two of these objectives could be forestalled if the definition 
of a U.S. domestic corporation were broadened to include a 
shareholder ownership test and if the U.S. international income tax 
system were changed into a real worldwide system. In this Article, we 
addressed ways to forestall the third objective by imposing limits on 
earnings stripping. 
Focusing on inversions, however, results in a view of earnings 
stripping that is far too narrow. A principal emphasis of this Article 
has been that earnings stripping presents challenges to the U.S. tax 
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base that are much broader than corporate inversions, and so we have 
developed an analytical framework for identifying responses to the 
full menu of earnings stripping tactics, of which inversions are only a 
part. 
That framework showed that deductions for interest payments 
on intra-MNE debt, which are the largest contributor to earnings 
stripping, are also the most vulnerable to criticism from a policy 
standpoint. Consequently, we examined various approaches to 
limiting earnings stripping interest deductions and concluded that the 
best promise lay in employing a proportionate allocation approach to 
distinguishing between interest expenses that are deductible as real 
costs and interest expenses that should be nondeductible because they 
are costless foreign related party payments that do not effect a proper 
inter-nation income allocation. 
We concluded that distinguishing between properly deductible 
and properly nondeductible royalty payments and payments for 
services is much more difficult and requires reliance on transfer 
pricing law. Fortunately, these items represent the smaller part of the 
earnings stripping challenge. 
Most importantly, cross-border earnings stripping is devastating 
to the tax bases of both worldwide and territorial international tax 
systems. Thus, action needs to be taken to curtail the use of earnings 
stripping to erode the U.S. tax base without waiting to resolve the 
controversy over whether the United States should adopt a territorial 
system or instead significantly strengthen its badly flawed worldwide 
system. 
